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GLOSSARY
Adaptation In human systems, the process of adjustment to actual or expected climate and its 
effects in order to moderate harm or exploit beneficial opportunities. In natural systems, 
the process of adjustment to actual climate and its effects; human intervention may 
facilitate adjustment to expected climate.
Adaptation benefits The avoided damage costs or the accrued benefits following the adoption and 
implementation of adaptation measures.
Adaptation costs Costs of planning, preparing for, facilitating, and implementing adaptation measures, 
including transaction costs.
Adaptation deficit The gap between the current state of a system and a state that minimizes adverse 
impacts from existing climate conditions and variability.
Adaptive capacity The combination of the strengths, attributes and resources available to an individual, 
community, society, or organization that can be used to prepare for and undertake 
actions to reduce adverse impacts, moderate harm, or exploit beneficial opportunities. 
Anticipatory adaptation Adaptation that takes place before impacts of climate change are observed. Also 
referred to as proactive adaptation.
Attribution The process of evaluating the relative contributions of multiple causal factors to a 
change or event with an assignment of statistical confidence.
Autonomous adaptation Adaptation that does not constitute a conscious response to climatic stimuli but is 
triggered by ecological changes in natural systems and by market or welfare changes in 
human systems.
Baseline State against which change is measured. It might be a current baseline, in which case it 
represents observable, present-day conditions. It might also be a ‘future baseline’, which 
is a projected future set of conditions excluding the driving factor of interest. Alternative 
interpretations of the reference conditions can give rise to multiple baselines.
Climate Climate in a narrow sense is usually defined as the ‘average weather’, or more rigorously, 
as the statistical description in terms of the mean and variability of relevant quantities 
over a period of time ranging from months to thousands or millions of years. These 
quantities are most often surface variables such as temperature, precipitation, and wind. 
Climate in a wider sense is the state, including a statistical description, of the climate 
system. 
Climate (change) impacts The effects of climate change on natural and human systems.
Climate (change) scenario A plausible and often simplified representation of the future climate based on an 
internally consistent set of climatological relationships and assumptions of radiative 
forcing, typically constructed for explicit use as input to climate change impact models. 
A ‘climate change scenario’ is the difference between a climate scenario and the current 
climate.
The entries in this glossary are adapted from definitions provided by authoritative sources, such as the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
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Climate change Any change in climate over time, whether due to natural variability or as a result of 
human activity.
Expenditure The ultimate payment of costs for goods and services (such as infrastructure, 
technology, equipment, information/knowledge, labour and finance itself ), including 
in-kind or non-monetary contributions.
Finance The allocation of investment capital, and the way such capital is mobilised and delivered. 
Through intermediary institutions, investment capital is made available as finance to 
different public and private actors in need of funding for expenditure.
Maladaptation Actions that may lead to increased risk of adverse climate-related outcomes, increased 
vulnerability to climate change, or diminished welfare, now or in the future.
Mitigation An anthropogenic intervention to reduce the anthropogenic forcing of the climate 
system; it includes strategies to reduce greenhouse gas sources and emissions and 
enhancing greenhouse gas sinks.
Planned adaptation Adaptation that is the result of a deliberate policy decision, based on an awareness that 
conditions have changed or are about to change and that action is required to return to, 
maintain, or achieve a desired state.
Private adaptation Adaptation that is initiated and implemented by individuals, households or private 
companies. Private adaptation is usually in the actor’s rational self-interest.
Public adaptation Adaptation that is initiated and implemented by governments at all levels. Public 
adaptation is usually directed at collective needs.
Reactive adaptation Adaptation that takes place after impacts of climate change have been observed.
Scenario A plausible and often simplified description of how the future may develop based 
on a coherent and internally consistent set of assumptions about driving forces and 
key relationships. Scenarios may be derived from projections but are often based on 
additional information from other sources, sometimes combined with a ‘narrative 
storyline’.
Uncertainty An expression of the degree to which a value (for example, the future state of the 
climate system) is unknown. Uncertainty can result from lack of information or from 
disagreement about what is known or even knowable. It may have many types of 
sources, from quantifiable errors in the data to ambiguously defined concepts or 
terminology, or uncertain projections of human behaviour. Uncertainty can therefore be 
represented by quantitative measures (such as a range of values calculated by various 
models) or by qualitative statements (for example, reflecting the judgement of a team of 
experts).
Vulnerability The propensity or predisposition to be adversely affected.
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ACRONYMS
AF Adaptation Fund
ASAP Adaptation for Smallholder Agriculture 
Programme
CBI Climate Bonds Initiative
CCRA Climate Change Risk Assessment
CoP Conference of Parties
CPEIR Climate Public Expenditure and Institutional 
Review
DFIs Development Finance Institutions
EACC Economics of Adaptation to Climate 
Change
ECA Export Credit Agency
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GHG Greenhouse Gases
IAM Integrated Assessment Modelling
IFC International Finance Corporation
IFF Investment and Financial Flows
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change
LAC Latin America and the Caribbean
LDCF Least Developed Countries Fund
LDCs Least Developed Countries
MDBs Multilateral Development Banks
MIGA Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
MSME Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises
NAP National Adaptation Plan
NAPA National Adaptation Programme of Action
OECD DAC Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development, Development Assistance 
Committee
ODA Official Development Assistance
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development
PPCR Pilot Programme for Climate Resilience
PPP Public Private Partnership
SCCF Special Climate Change Fund
SIDS Small-island Developing States
SME Small- and Medium-sized Enterprises
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change
x Forwardeword
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The Paris Agreement has raised the political profile of climate 
resilience. There is now a global goal for climate change 
adaptation and it is recognized that adaptation represents a 
challenge with local, national and international dimensions. 
The 2016 Adaptation Finance Gap Report explores the costs 
of meeting adaptation needs and assesses the funding that is 
available for doing so. It suggests that although international 
public funding for adaptation has increased in recent years, 
the previous assessments of the costs of adaptation have 
involved significant underestimates.  This leaves us with a gap 
– the adaptation finance gap – which we need to fill if we are 
to meet the ambitions of the Paris Agreement. 
The Report considers the options for bridging the finance 
gap. One of the strong messages emerging from the report 
is that mitigation is the best first option. Because adaptation 
is a function of a missed mark for mitigation, it is important 
that there remains an emphasis on emission reductions. 
Nevertheless, even if emissions can be cut effectively, a very 
large adaptation burden will remain and the communities 
least equipped to bear this burden will face the greatest 
impacts. 
It is for this reason that sustainable development and climate 
solutions are closely linked. Without addressing climate 
change impacts, sustainable development is undermined, 
and investments are lost. We can ill afford such losses.
The Report considers the way in which private finance 
can help to bridge the adaptation gap. It details four ways 
governments and business can work together to encourage 
better integration of adaptation practices, including 
providing businesses with access to the information and 
tools they need to integrate adaptation into investment 
decisions.
Greater emphasis must be put on the question of 
effectiveness.  Increasing the volume of finance only 
increases resilience if it is spent wisely. Adaptation is not 
only about responding to specific impacts, but about 
creating resilience to a range of uncertainties. Investing in 
the underlying capacity of the most vulnerable people and 
ecosystems therefore, is at the heart of truly sustainable 
adaptation.
Mette Løyche Wilkie
Director
Division of Environmental Policy and Implementation
FOREWORD
The adoption of the Paris Agreement at the twenty-
first session of the Conference of the Parties (CoP21) 
to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
in November 2015 was a landmark achievement, with 
195 countries endorsing an ambitious climate change 
agreement that includes a global goal on adaptation. More 
robust information on adaptation needs, costs, and 
finance is needed to guide and inform the successful 
implementation of the Paris Agreement. To support the 
provision of such information, the 2016 Adaptation Finance 
Gap Report presents an indicative assessment of the current 
knowledge on global adaptation costs, the finance available 
to meet these costs, and the anticipated difference between 
these two figures – the adaptation finance gap.
The report builds on a 2014 assessment by the United 
Nations Environment Programme, which laid out the 
concept of adaptation gaps and outlined three such gaps: 
technology, finance and knowledge. Like the 2014 report, 
the 2016 report focuses on developing countries, where 
adaptation capacity is often the lowest and needs are the 
highest, and concentrates on the period up to 2050, as the 
short to medium term is considered the most relevant for 
decision-making related to adaptation.
The report highlights trends and challenges associated with 
measuring progress towards bridging the adaptation finance 
gap, while informing national and international efforts to 
advance adaptation. It analyses adaptation finance against the 
background of the provisions laid out in the Paris Agreement, 
and benefits from the insights included in the NDCs.
The Paris Agreement includes several provisions to 
advance adaptation, of which three are particularly 
important for the assessment in this report: the 
adoption of a global goal for adaptation, the commitment to 
increase UNFCCC developed country-party funding flowing 
to developing country parties, and the requirement for 
parties to draw-up and regularly update adaptation plans 
and strategies. In addition, the Paris Agreement calls on 
parties to the UNFCCC to “engage in adaptation planning 
processes and the implementation of actions” (Article 7.9), 
as well as to report on progress every five years (Article 7.10). 
Recognising that the methodologies needed to underpin 
adaptation planning and implementation are poorly 
developed, the Paris Agreement also includes a range of 
provisions concerning methodology development.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
THE COSTS OF ADAPTATION 
Cost estimates vary strongly with the level of global 
warming, the methods used to estimate them, the ethical 
choices made, the economic framework applied, and the 
assumptions made. As such, there is no single estimate of 
the costs of adaptation. The report provides an indicative 
range of costs, based on an assessment of the literature.
Building on the 2014 Adaptation Gap Report, a more in-
depth review of national and sector cost estimates has been 
undertaken for the preparation of this report. This work 
confirms and reinforces the findings presented in the 2014 
report: the costs of adaptation are likely to be two-
to-three times higher than current global estimates 
by 2030, and potentially four-to-five times higher by 
2050. Previous global estimates of the costs of adaptation 
in developing countries have been placed at between 
US$70 billion and US$100 billion a year for the period 2010-
2050. However, the national and sector literature surveyed in 
this report indicates that the costs of adaptation could range 
from US$140 billion to US$300 billion by 2030, and between 
US$280 billion and US$500 billion by 2050. This literature 
highlights that assumptions have a strong influence on 
the cost estimates, and that studies that focus on policy 
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Adaptation gap definitions
The adaptation gap can be defined generically as the 
difference between the level of adaptation actually 
implemented and a societally set target or goal, which 
reflects nationally determined needs related to climate 
change impacts, as well as resource limitations and 
competing priorities. 
The adaptation finance gap can then be defined and 
measured as the difference between the costs of, 
and thus the finance required, for meeting a given 
adaptation target and the amount of finance available 
to do so. Assessment of the adaptation finance gap is 
facilitated by the availability of a common monetary 
metric. However it must be noted that finance is 
a means rather than an end – availability of funds 
does not guarantee that they are used efficiently and 
effectively to increase climate resilience and reduce 
vulnerability.
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implementation and national circumstances generally 
report higher adaptation costs.
The costs of adaptation in developing countries are 
increasing, strengthening the case for immediate and 
enhanced mitigation action. Global, national and sector 
studies show that adaptation costs increase under higher 
emissions scenarios. This reinforces the notion that deep 
mitigation actions are the best insurance against rapidly 
rising adaptation costs and the potential limits of adaptation.
Improved estimates of the costs of adaptation require more 
and better-designed studies to be conducted. Additional 
empirical studies are especially needed for sectors or risks 
that are currently understudied, notably biodiversity and 
ecosystem services. Testing how the choice of method 
and assumptions affect cost estimates, possibly through 
sensitivity testing and multi-model analysis, is equally 
important. Not least, follow-up analyses are required, to 
better understand the magnitude of opportunity, transaction 
and implementation costs.
ADAPTATION FINANCE 
Total bilateral and multilateral finance for climate 
change adaptation reached US$25 billion in 2014, of 
which US$22.5 billion targeted developing countries, 
highlighting a steady rise over the past five years. 
Most funds originate from development finance institutions 
(US$21 billion, or 84 per cent of the total) and are delivered 
through low-cost or market-rate project debt (53 per cent 
and 26 per cent of the total, respectively). Developing 
countries in East Asia and the Pacific attract almost half of the 
funding (some 46 per cent of the total). Over half of the total 
finance (55 per cent) is directed to water and wastewater 
management projects.
Dedicated climate funds help break down barriers 
to investment in adaptation projects in developing 
countries and play an important role in catalysing a 
wide range of adaptation-related investments. They do 
this by strengthening the capacities of local stakeholders, 
creating incentives for institutions and investors (for example, 
by offering concessional terms) and, ultimately, by taking on 
risks from which commercial financiers will typically shy away.
The US$1.2 billion Pilot Programme for Climate Resilience 
and the almost US$1 billion Least-developed Countries Fund 
are the largest adaptation-targeted funds. Yet developed-
country contributions to these funds are low when 
compared to contributions to mitigation-focused 
funds. The Green Climate Fund, which recently entered into 
operation, is expected to play a significant role in financing 
adaptation, as it seeks to reach an equal split between 
adaptation and mitigation.
By the end of 2015, just over US$35 billion, corresponding to 
76 per cent of the resources pledged to adaptation-focused 
climate funds, had been approved for disbursement. The 
trend for the period 2011-2015 is one of growth, and includes 
the approval of the Green Climate Fund’s first eight projects, 
four of which are adaptation projects. Some of the poorest 
countries in sub-Saharan African, and South Asia have 
been the main recipients of funding for adaptation 
from dedicated climate funds. Small-island developing 
states are among the main recipients of adaptation 
finance for disaster risk reduction.
A proper measurement, tracking, and reporting system 
for adaptation investments is indispensable to ensure that 
finance is used efficiently and targeted where it is most 
needed. Significant progress has been made over the past 
ten years in tracking international adaptation finance. 
Improved tracking of, and reporting on, financial 
flows has the potential to increase the efficiency with 
which international adaptation finance is used. In 
recent years, a number of steps have been taken to this end: 
in February 2016 an improved definition of the OECD Rio 
Marker for tracking bilateral official development assistance 
targeting adaptation was adopted, and in early 2015, six 
large multilateral development banks and the International 
Development Finance Club agreed on a set of common 
principles for tracking climate finance.
PRIVATE SECTOR FINANCE FOR 
ADAPTATION 
Despite progress, data gaps and difficulties in measuring and 
reporting private financial flows persist. Climate-resilience 
activities are often integrated into development 
interventions or business activities, and therefore 
rarely stand-alone. For this reason, private sector 
adaptation-related investments are difficult to identify and 
classify, which results in the data gaps mentioned above. 
Yet the private sector plays a key role in adaptation. Beyond 
management of its own exposure to climate risks, different 
kinds of private finance – debt, equity, insurance 
products – hold potential for helping to bridge the 
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adaptation finance gap. Improving our understanding of 
private sector financing for adaptation is key to unleash this 
potential.
Outside of a purely adaptation-related context, private sector 
contributions – from foreign direct investment, private debt, 
remittances and official development assistance – make-up 
the largest components of financial inflows to developing 
countries. The distribution of flows is uneven, with least-
developed countries struggling to attract significant 
volumes of private debt or equity outside resource 
sectors.
While quantitative estimates of financial flows are not 
available, private domestic investment and remittances 
are good examples of adaptation-relevant investments. 
Private domestic investment levels are rising in developing 
countries and, if this trend holds true for micro- and small-
sized enterprises, a portion of those funds is likely to be 
spent on adaptation-relevant activities, particularly for those 
enterprises active in agriculture, a sector that is especially 
sensitive to climate change.
Remittances are currently around 3.5 times larger than the 
total flows of official development assistance, and play a 
major role in developing country economies, for individual 
households, and for small businesses and entrepreneurs. 
Although data availability prevents assessing the share of 
remittances going to adaptation-related uses, remittances 
may be valuable from an adaptation perspective because 
they tend to increase in cases of catastrophic weather 
events and natural disasters in migrants’ countries of 
origin. Furthermore, remittances reach households directly, 
including those in remote and vulnerable areas, more rapidly 
than public finance flows.
Generic barriers to private sector investment in developing 
countries are well known, and include poor legal, economic 
and regulatory frameworks, immature financial markets, and 
currency exchange risks. These generic barriers obstruct 
private sector adaptation to climate change. Adding to these 
are barriers that are specific to climate change, such as the 
cost-saving nature of adaptation investment, which contrasts 
with the revenue-creation motivation of the private sector, or 
various social and cultural barriers.
Domestic government agencies and development 
institutions can help break down barriers to private 
sector adaptation by undertaking targeted financial 
and non-financial interventions. Strengthening the ability 
of development banks to mobilise private sector investment 
is the financial intervention that has been used most. Key 
non-financial interventions include improving the provision 
of data and information, and introducing policies that are 
conducive to private sector investment, notably economic 
inducements.
THE ADAPTATION FINANCE GAP 
Today, developing countries already face an 
adaptation finance gap. This gap is large and likely to grow 
substantially over the coming decades, unless significant 
progress is made to secure new and additional finance for 
adaptation, and to put into effect ambitious mitigation 
measures. This finding emerges from assessing the costs of 
adaptation against available international public adaptation 
finance.
Adaptation finance flows have increased in recent 
years, but current finance levels fall short of present-day 
adaptation costs and are likely to do so in the future. 
Current adaptation costs are likely to be at least 2 to 
3 times higher than international public finance for 
adaptation. Looking forward to 2030, the assessment of 
national and sector studies shows that adaptation costs 
in the period around 2030 are likely to be in the range of 
US$140-300 billion per annum, whereas international public 
finance for adaptation in 2014 was around US$22.5 billion. 
While the two figures are for different points in time and 
differ in terms of definition and coverage, they illustrate 
that, to meet finance needs and avoid an adaptation 
gap, the total finance for adaptation in 2030 would 
have to be approximately 6 to 13 times greater than 
international public finance today. Moreover, the 
potential adaptation finance gap in 2050 would be much 
larger – in the order of between twelve-to-twenty-two times 
current flows of international public adaptation finance.
Integrated assessment model estimates of the costs of 
adaptation globally suggest that costs could be even higher 
than the estimates produced in the context of national and 
sector studies. Furthermore, model estimates illustrate the 
emissions-dependency of adaptation costs, and highlight 
that adaptation cost levels for different warming scenarios 
could diverge as early as the 2030s. It follows that 
enhanced mitigation ambition and pre-2020 action is 
central for limiting adaptation costs.
Scaling up both public and private sources of finance is 
required to bridge the adaptation finance gap, now and in 
the future. Current estimates of adaptation finance flows are 
partial, as data limitations and methodological challenges 
prevent the inclusion of private sector and domestic public 
finance flows for adaptation. However, exclusion of these 
flows is unlikely to change the conclusions regarding short- 
and medium-term adaptation finance gaps, as current 
adaptation finance falls well short of needs. 
The Paris Agreement restated the 2020 commitment by 
developed country parties of mobilizing US$100 billion 
per year for adaptation and mitigation until 2025, and 
requires parties to increase that commitment after 2025. 
Assuming an equal allocation of finance between adaptation 
and mitigation (as called for in the Paris Agreement), this 
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commitment could go a long way toward bridging the 
adaptation finance gap.
The Paris Agreement and its implementation offer 
opportunities for significantly bolstering progress with 
adaptation to climate change and addressing the adaptation 
finance gap. The Paris Agreement recognises that 
adaptation is a global challenge with multifaceted 
local, subnational, national, regional and international 
dimensions and provides a framework for enhancing 
global and national adaptation action. Implementation 
of the methodological provisions in the Paris Agreement 
would address many of the challenges identified in this 
report with regard to estimating adaptation costs, and 
(tracking and) mobilising additional financial flows for 
adaptation, including from the private sector. 
The Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) 
represent a valuable starting point for such efforts, and 
the adaptation components in the NDCs indicate that 
current costs exceed current finance levels. Furthermore, 
the NDCs illustrate that there are similarities between 
the types of climate risks and adaptation responses that 
communities, sectors, countries and regions are facing, and 
provide a stepping stone for framing clearer goals, targets 
and metrics for adaptation, which can help set the direction 
for adaptation action and facilitate tracking progress.
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1.1 CONTEXT AND OBJECTIVES  
OF THE REPORT
The adoption of the Paris Agreement at the twenty-first 
session of the Conference on the Parties (CoP21) to the 
United Nations Framework Convention of Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) in November 2015 was a landmark achievement, 
with 195 countries endorsing an ambitious climate change 
agreement that includes a global goal on adaptation. 
More robust information on adaptation needs, costs and 
finance will be central to guide and inform the successful 
implementation of the Paris Agreement. To support the 
provision of such information, the 2016 Adaptation Finance 
Gap Report provides an assessment of adaptation needs 
and costs, the finance available to meet those needs, and 
the anticipated difference between these two figures – the 
adaptation finance gap. The report builds on the 2014 
Adaptation Gap Report by the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP), which reviewed three areas – finance, 
technology and knowledge – that contribute to successful 
adaptation. In addition, the 2014 report put forward a 
conceptual framework for assessing adaptation gaps 
associated to meeting (hypothetical) goals in each of those 
areas.
The conceptual framework developed by the 2014 
Adaptation Gap Report assumes that an adaptation goal 
can be established for the area of interest. It defines the 
adaptation gap as the difference between the adaptation 
levels that would be consistent with the agreed adaptation 
goal at a given point in time, and the levels achieved through 
the adaptation measures actually implemented (Box 1.1).
While it was presented in the context of the above three 
areas only, the framework was designed to be applicable 
across other areas that may be relevant to climate change 
adaptation. The present report hones in on one such area 
– finance – and provides an assessment of the literature 
concerning the adaptation finance gap in a developing 
country context. The adaptation finance gap is defined as the 
difference between the costs of adaptation and the financing 
available to meet them at a given point in time. Furthermore, 
the present report expands on the preliminary findings 
presented in a 2015 brochure by UNEP (UNEP 2015), which 
also included an overview of the adaptation components in 
the nationally determined contributions (NDCs).
The 2016 report reinforces the findings of the 2014 report. 
It includes a more in-depth review of national-level cost 
estimates (bottom-up studies), and global-level, sector-
specific estimates, while providing additional global-level 
model estimates (top-down estimates).1 It updates and 
complements information on climate finance for adaptation 
presented in the 2014 report, for example, by highlighting 
barriers to, and potential enablers of, adaptation finance.
Data and methodological issues remain, however, particularly 
with the tracking of adaptation finance in both domestic 
budgets as well as the private sector. This report takes 
a closer look at the challenges and opportunities for 
improvements in tracking adaptation finance, with a focus 
on the private sector and the barriers and opportunities 
for mobilising adaptation finance within it. It concludes by 
assessing the state of the adaptation finance gap from now 
until 2050, and the options for bridging it.
1 Bottom-up studies calculate costs by adding up the costs of each 
of the measures in a specific, pre-determined portfolio of adapta-
tion actions. Typically, these actions are national or sub-national in 
scope. In contrast, top-down studies calculate costs by relating total 
impacts with impact damages, often at the global level and on the 
basis of a sectoral breakdown of cost elements.
Box 1.1: Adaptation gap definitions
The adaptation gap can be defined generically as the difference between the level of adaptation actually 
implemented and a societally set target or goal, which reflects nationally determined needs related to climate 
change impacts, as well as resource limitations and competing priorities.
The adaptation finance gap can then be defined and measured as the difference between the costs of, and 
the finance required for, meeting a given adaptation target and the amount of finance available to do so. 
Assessment of the adaptation finance gap is facilitated by the availability of a common monetary metric. 
However, it must be noted that finance is a means rather than an end – availability of funds does not guarantee 
that they are used efficiently and effectively to increase climate resilience and reduce vulnerability.
Source: UNEP (2015)
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KEY FINDINGS FROM 2014
The first Adaptation Gap Report (UNEP 2014) reviewed the evidence base on the costs of adaptation, collating and 
comparing the results of global and national studies, and found that a major adaptation finance gap is likely. The analysis 
considered the existing evidence base of national and sector studies, and used this to provide an initial assessment of 
the possible aggregated global costs of adaptation. The review concluded that existing estimates of the global costs of 
adaptation of US$70 billion to US$100 billion per year globally for the period up to 20502 were likely to be a significant 
underestimate. It indicated that the costs of adaptation could be two-to three times higher than this by 2030, and 
plausibly four-to-five times higher by 2050. The review also reported that future adaptation costs would not be equally 
distributed, with the least, developed countries (LDCs) and small, island developing states (SIDS) concluded to have much 
higher (relative) adaptation needs, highlighting the priority for adaptation in these regions.
In regards to finance, the 2014 Adaptation Gap Report found that the amount of public finance committed to adaptation 
objectives was within the range of US$23-26 billion in 2012-2013, with 90 per cent of flows invested in developing 
countries. Official development assistance (ODA), climate funds, and commitments from development finance 
institutions (DFIs) accounted for the majority of expenditures, with the 2014 report finding evidence of increased financial 
commitments for adaptation across all sources of finance, with adaptation finance being increasingly mainstreamed into 
development cooperation activities.
2  The World Bank EACC study estimated the costs of planned adaptation at US$70 billion to US$100 billion a year in the period 2010–2050 for 
developing countries (World Bank 2010). This study was cited in the IPCC 5th Assessment Report (Chambwera et al. 2014), although the IPCC report 
noted there was little confidence in these numbers, and that there was strong evidence of important omissions and shortcomings in data and 
methods, rendering these estimates highly preliminary.
1.2 ADAPTATION FINANCE IN 
INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE NEGOTIATIONS
The Paris Agreement, capturing the outcomes of the 2015 
CoP21, includes several provisions to advance adaptation, 
of which three are particularly important and relevant to 
this report: the adoption of a global goal on adaptation, 
the commitment to increase UNFCCC developed country-
party funding flowing to developing country parties, and 
the requirement on parties to draw up and regularly update 
adaptation plans and strategies.
In Article 7.1, the Paris Agreement states that, “Parties hereby 
establish the global goal on adaptation of enhancing 
adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience and reducing 
vulnerability to climate change, with a view to contributing 
to sustainable development and ensuring an adequate 
adaptation response in the context of the temperature goal 
referred to in Article 2” (UNFCCC 2015). While the goal does 
not represent an operational tool through which progress 
can be tracked in quantitative terms, agreement by parties 
to adopt such a goal signifies the increased attention to 
adaptation in international climate change negotiations. 
Not least, the explicit reference to the temperature goal 
underscores that the efforts required to adapt to climate 
change are dependent on the extent and timing of climate 
change mitigation efforts.
The Paris Agreement also restates the 2020 commitment 
by developed country parties of mobilising US$100 billion 
per year until 2025, and requires these parties to increase 
that commitment after 2025. In what constituted an 
unprecedented provision in international climate change 
negotiations, Article 9.4 of the Agreement calls for a 
balance between adaptation and mitigation finance and 
support, thus responding to a longstanding demand from 
developing country parties. Notwithstanding, the split 
between adaptation and mitigation is not specified, in 
spite of demands by some developing country parties. The 
Agreement further recognises the need for public and grant-
based resources for climate change adaptation, in particular 
with regard to least-developed countries and small-island 
developing states.
In addition, the Paris Agreement calls on parties to the 
UNFCCC to “engage in adaptation planning processes 
and the implementation of actions” (UNFCCC 2015, 
Article 7.9), as well as to report on progress every five 
years (UNFCCC 2015, Article 7.10). Recognising that the 
methodologies needed to underpin adaptation planning 
and implementation are poorly developed, the Paris 
Agreement includes a range of provisions concerning 
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methodology development. Similarly, acknowledging 
that most developing country parties are likely to require 
external assistance to conduct this work, the Agreement 
calls for support to these parties. In addition to fostering 
adaptation efforts at the national level, national reports are 
intended to underpin a global-level stocktake of progress 
toward meeting the aforementioned adaptation goal, a 
process that will also run in five-year cycles.
Intended Nationally Determined Contributions
In the lead-up to CoP21, parties to the UNFCCC 
prepared intended nationally determined 
contributions (INDCs), wherein countries publicly 
outline the post-2020 climate actions and agendas 
they plan to implement under a new international 
climate agreement. The majority of INDCs with a strong 
focus on adaptation came from developing country 
parties, and underlined the party’s key needs in relation 
to adaptation to climate change. These overviews 
highlighted that (i) financing is a key concern for all 
developing country parties, particularly in regards to 
cost estimations and identifying sources of finance, 
and (ii) consistent methodologies and metrics around 
adaptation costs and finance are needed to gauge 
progress toward adaptation (UNEP 2015). After the Paris 
Agreement enters into force in 2016, INDCs become 
nationally determined contributions (NDCs). As such, 
this report refers to NDCs throughout.
Photo: © Asian Development Bank
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1.3 KEY CONCEPTS UNDERLYING THE 
ADAPTATION FINANCE GAP ASSESSMENT
This report seeks to assess the evidence regarding estimates 
of both the costs of, and financing available for, adaptation 
to climate change. The assessment is undertaken to explore 
the potential implications for current and future adaptation 
finance gaps, defined and measured as the difference 
between the costs of meeting a given adaptation target and 
the amount of finance available to do so at a given point in 
time. The adaptation finance gap is one dimension of the 
overall adaptation gap, that is, the difference between the 
level of adaption required to reach a specific adaptation goal 
and the level of adaptation actually implemented. 
An important point to bear in mind throughout this report 
is that in general, countries, cities and communities are 
not adequately adapted to existing climate risks. In other 
words, there is an existing adaptation gap. In the literature, 
this existing gap is often referred to as an adaptation deficit 
(see for example Burton 2004). There is broad recognition 
that this existing adaptation gap (or deficit) is a subset of 
a larger development gap (or deficit). As noted in UNEP’s 
preliminary Adaptation Gap Report (UNEP 2014), delays in 
both adaptation and mitigation action are likely to increase 
the development gap (IPCC 2014), thereby adding to the 
adaptation gap. To build future adaptive capacity and lower 
the costs of adaptation in the future, it is important to reduce 
the existing adaptation gap.
Future climate change will lead to wide ranging economic 
costs in market and non-market sectors. Adaptation can 
moderate these impacts. The benefits of adaptation are 
the reduction in these future climate impacts (the avoided 
damage cost), which can be compared to the costs of 
planning, facilitating, and implementing adaptation (the 
costs of adaptation). However, there is a further trade-
off with the impacts (and costs) of climate change after 
adaptation, that is, the residual damage. The costs of 
adaptation can be estimated for different aggregation levels 
and using different frameworks, objectives and methods. In 
this report, which is focused around the national to global 
domain, two main lines of evidence are used. Firstly, global 
estimates are provided. These are provided by global studies 
and models which operate at an aggregated scale, and are 
referred to in this report as top-down studies. Secondly, 
national and sectoral estimates are provided, which include 
more detailed assessments and are referred to in this report 
as bottom-up studies. Both approaches have strengths and 
weaknesses and the adaptation gap assessment combines 
the evidence from both to provide a more comprehensive 
and robust analysis.
Adaptation has been defined as “the process of adjustment 
to actual or expected climate and its effects” (IPCC, 2014). 
Adjustment can take two main forms: interventions that 
seek to exploit beneficial opportunities brought about by 
climate change and interventions that seek to avoid the 
harm resulting from it. Those interventions, which typically 
face trade-offs with other policy objectives, are undertaken 
by both public and private sector agents (Chambwera et 
al. 2014). 
Partially reflecting the aforementioned definition of 
adaptation that distinguishes between responses to actual 
and expected climate impacts, it is common to distinguish 
between reactive adaptation (taking place after impacts of 
climate change are observed) and anticipatory adaptation 
(taking place before impacts of climate change are 
observed), as well as between autonomous and planned 
adaptation. Autonomous adaptation can be defined as 
“adaptation that does not constitute a conscious response 
to climatic stimuli but is triggered by ecological changes 
in natural systems and by market or welfare changes in 
human systems” (IPCC 2014). Autonomous adaptation is 
typically used to describe actions by households, businesses 
or communities acting on their own without public 
intervention, but within an existing public policy framework. 
Actions by these actors are also sometimes referred to as 
private adaptation, and usually reflect the actor’s self-interest. 
In contrast, planned adaptation results from deliberate 
policy decisions aimed at returning, maintaining or elevating 
resilience conditions to a desired state, and is mostly used 
to describe public adaptation. Public adaptation is usually 
directed at collective, societal needs. 
Much of the literature on adaptation costs and available 
data for adaptation financing focuses on planned public 
adaptation and omits autonomous and private adaptation. 
Including autonomous and private adaptation in the analysis 
of the costs of adaptation will increase cost estimates, 
potentially significantly. 
Adaptation finance can take one of four forms: international 
public finance, public domestic finance, private international 
finance, or private domestic finance. This report reports 
primarily on financing for international public planned 
adaptation, as defined above. The public sector is the 
main funder of such activities, channelling domestic and 
international budgets into a wide range of projects aimed 
at increasing resilience to climate change. International 
budgets are earmarked, as they follow certain rules aimed 
at facilitating the tracking of such financing. Conversely, 
domestic budgets are typically managed by line ministries 
and are seldom earmarked as supporting adaptation to 
climate change. For this reason, while data concerning 
international public finance is relatively complete, data on 
domestic budgets is limited.
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Engaging the private sector in financing adaptation, both 
nationally and internationally, involves a wide range of 
private, as well as public, actors. These include businesses 
(both domestic and international, in all sectors), private 
finance institutions, and ultimately, those who provide the 
source of the investment capital in the first place (including 
household savings, as well as major institutional investors 
such as pension funds) and insurance companies. On 
the public side, relevant actors include public institutions 
(notably development cooperation agencies and finance 
institutions), who source private capital and provide public 
revenue towards catalysing private investment, and blend 
private and public finance. It also includes governments, who 
in addition to finance, can also utilize policy and regulation to 
create enabling conditions for private investment. 
Finance versus expenditure
The term finance is generally used to refer to both 
the allocation of investment capital, and the way 
such capital is mobilised and delivered. Through 
intermediary institutions, investment capital is made 
available as finance to different public and private 
actors in need of funding for expenditure. Expenditure 
refers to the ultimate payment of costs for goods and 
services (such as infrastructure, technology, equipment, 
information and knowledge, labour and finance itself ), 
including in-kind or non-monetary contributions. 
Without finance, even expenditure that yields a 
positive economic return may not be possible due to, 
for instance, the way costs (or risks) are concentrated or 
distributed over time or in the market.
1.4 STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT
The report consists of four additional chapters, covering the 
following issues:
• Chapter 2 includes an overview of estimates of the 
costs of adaptation. This overview seeks to contrast 
bottom-up estimates (national-level studies) with top-
down estimates (global-level studies) of varying scope, 
to provide an estimate of the costs of adaptation at the 
global level.
• Chapter 3 provides a summary of current finance levels, 
broken down by source, use and role. In addition, the 
chapter reports on progress with tracking adaptation 
finance.
• Chapter 4 focuses on private sector financing, 
highlighting trends in private finance and expenditure, 
as well as barriers to the scale up of these trends. 
The chapter reports on financial and non-financial 
mechanisms that can be used to increase the level of 
financing for adaptation.
• Chapter 5 provides a preliminary estimate of the 
adaptation finance gap. It concludes by exploring how 
the findings in the report may support international 
climate change negotiations. Special attention is paid 
to the way in which the adaptation gap concept can 
support implementation of the Paris Agreement.
The report has been written by 12 lead authors, supported 
by 13 contributing authors, affiliated to 15 organisations. An 
advanced draft of the report was reviewed by 31 individuals, 
working on all continents.
The Adaptation Finance Gap Report    7
Photo: © Caroline Schaer (UNEP DTU Partnership)
The Adaptation Fi ance Gap Report
8   Chapter 2 | The costs of adaptation
02
The Adaptation Finance Gap Report    9
CHAPTER 2
THE COSTS OF 
ADAPTATION
LEAD AUTHORS
PAUL WATKISS (PAUL WATKISS ASSOCIATES), FLORENT 
BAARSCH (CLIMATE ANALYTICS), NICK KINGSMILL 
(VIVID ECONOMICS)
CONTRIBUTING AUTHORS (alphabetical)
FRANCESCO BOSELLO (FONDAZIONE ENI ENRICO 
MATTEI), FEDERICA CIMATO (PAUL WATKISS 
ASSOCIATES), KELLY DE BRUIN (UMEÅ UNIVERSITY), 
ENRICA DE CIAN (FONDAZIONE ENI ENRICO MATTEI)
Photo: © Stuart Price (AMISOM)
10   Chapter 2 | The costs of adaptation
2.1 INTRODUCTION
The Fifth Assessment Report by the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC) reported global estimates of the 
costs of adaptation in developing countries of between 
US$70 billion and US$100 billion per year for the period 
Figure 2.1: Indicative adaptation costs
World Bank (2010)
A
da
pt
at
io
n 
co
st
s 
pe
r y
ea
r f
or
 d
ev
el
op
in
g 
co
un
tr
ie
s 
in
 b
ill
io
n 
U
S$
UNEP (2014)
Global aggregated sector impact assessment
Indicative
level of
costs 
based on 
synthesis of 
bottom-up 
studies
Indicative
level of
costs 
based on 
synthesis of 
bottom-up 
studies
2010 2030 2050
0
100
200
300
400
600
500
KEY FINDINGS
• Estimates of the costs of adaptation vary strongly, depending on the methodology used, the analytical principles 
applied, and the assumptions made. These choices involve complex and often subjective issues and, as such, there 
are different views on them. Therefore, there is no single estimate of the costs of adaptation.
• Previous estimates of the costs of adaptation in developing countries are likely to be underestimates. A review of the 
literature on national- and sector-level studies reinforces the findings presented in the 2014 Adaptation Gap Report: 
by 2030, the costs of adaptation could be two-to-three times higher than the range cited in the literature and four-to-
five times higher by 2050.
• In light of limited financing and uncertainties about future impacts, developing country adaptation actions are 
placing heightened emphasis on early adaptation actions, low-regrets options, options that build-in flexibility and 
robustness for longer-term decisions, and early planning for likely major future risks.
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between 2010 and 2050 (IPCC 2014). These estimates are 
largely based on a 2010 study by the World Bank (World Bank 
2010). The IPCC report notes that there is low confidence in 
these estimates due to methodological challenges and data 
shortcomings. 
Over recent years, the number of national- and sector-
level assessments on the costs of adaptation has increased 
significantly. These assessments, which were reviewed in 
the 2014 Adaptation Gap Report, show that the World Bank 
estimates are likely to underestimate the costs of adaptation 
in developing countries. Compared to the 2014 Adaptation 
Gap Report, this chapter presents additional information 
on national- and sector-level assessments. The information 
summarised in the chapter represents the most up-to-date 
and scientifically robust evidence available on the costs of 
adaptation in developing countries.
The chapter is structured around four sections in addition 
to this introduction. Section 2.2 offers a brief summary of 
global-level studies on the costs of adaptation. Section 
2.3 provides a critical review of the national- and sector-
level studies mentioned above. Section 2.4 examines the 
assumptions and choices that affect this kind of assessment, 
putting cost estimates in context. Section 2.5 outlines how 
adaptation planning and implementation in developing 
countries is evolving, not least in light of limited finance and 
uncertainty about future impacts (and the costs associated 
with reducing those impacts).
2.2 GLOBAL LEVEL ESTIMATES OF THE 
COSTS OF ADAPTATION IN DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES
Since the mid-2000s, a number of different approaches, often 
termed top-down approaches, have been used to estimate 
the costs of adapting to climate change at the global level. 
These include investment and financial flow assessments, 
aggregated sectoral impact assessments, and integrated 
assessment modelling. Each approach is briefly outlined in 
this section. More recently, some experts have argued that 
approaches based on alternative and more advanced models, 
such as dynamic stochastic computable general equilibrium 
models and agent-based models, should play an increasing 
role in estimating the costs of adaptation (Stern 2016).
The earliest widely-cited estimate of the costs of adaptation is 
based on a study sponsored by the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC 2007). The study was 
based on an investment and financial flow assessment 
approach that increased investment needs by a certain 
amount, depending on the perceived adaptation requirements. 
The study focused on the agriculture, forestry and fishery, water 
supply, human health, coastal, and infrastructure sectors. It 
ultimately suggested overall adaptation costs of US$48 billion 
to US$171 billion per year by 2030, of which between half and 
two-thirds would be borne in developing countries. A 2009 
critique of this work highlighted a number of shortcomings of 
its approach – notably in relation to the adaptation deficit and 
the initial investment levels needed. This critique suggested 
that, due to limited coverage of sectors and risks, the study may 
have underestimated the costs of adaptation by a factor of two-
to-three (Parry et al. 2009).
In 2010, the World Bank published a study that followed 
a global scenario-based aggregated sectoral impact 
assessment approach (World Bank 2010). As highlighted 
in the introduction to this chapter, the study suggested that 
adaptation in developing countries may cost between US$70 
billion and US$100 billion per year for the period between 
2010 and 2050. The study covered the following sectors, 
albeit with only partial coverage within them: agriculture, 
forestry, fisheries, infrastructure, water resources, health, 
coastal areas, and extreme weather events. Furthermore, the 
study concluded that (i) the East Asia and Pacific region is 
likely to bear the highest overall costs, but the sub-Saharan 
Africa region would bear the highest costs per unit of gross 
domestic product (GDP); and (ii) the highest absolute costs 
would be borne by middle-income countries, but low-
income countries would experience the highest costs per 
unit of GDP.
The sectoral coverage in these studies is partial, as is the 
coverage of risks within the targeted sectors. In addition, the 
studies use different approaches: some assess the optimal 
level of adaptation (trading-off adaptation against residual 
damages), while others quantify the costs associated with 
identified needs. The studies also represent adaptation 
in different ways and with varying levels of sectoral and 
technical detail. The following sections provide more detail 
on these and other aspects that explain why estimates of 
adaptation costs differ between studies.
Integrated assessment models take a different approach. 
They were developed to explore the costs of both mitigating 
greenhouse-gas emissions and adapting to future climate 
change impacts (Nordhaus and Boyer 1999, Plambeck et 
al. 1997). These models estimate the global and regional 
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impacts of climate change, and then extend the analysis 
to the costs and benefits of adaptation. They do this by 
connecting long-term economic development trajectories 
to a temperature pathway, the societal impacts of which are 
calculated through a mathematical function that is meant to 
characterise the average magnitude of those impacts.
Typically, integrated assessment models either aim to identify 
an optimal balance of mitigation, adaptation, and residual 
damages, or they seek to determine the most cost-effective 
way of adapting to a set mitigation target. A number of 
scientific reports and peer-reviewed publications have used 
integrated assessment models to estimate the future costs of 
adaptation. In 2009, the OECD used AD-RICE and AD-WITCH 
to examine the economics of adaptation to climate change. 
Specifically, this work sought to estimate total climate 
change costs, including mitigation, residual damages, and 
adaptation (de Bruin et al. 2009). A subsequent OECD study 
estimated adaptation costs in developed and developing 
countries (Agrawala et al. 2011a). 
Studies of adaptation costs based on integrated assessment 
models typically find that adaptation is a highly effective 
response to climate change, with high benefits relative to 
costs. Furthermore, these studies provide insights into how 
adaptation costs may vary under different climate change 
scenarios. They indicate that even in the period between 
2030 and 2050, adaptation costs could vary considerably 
between a 2°C warming scenario and higher warming 
scenarios. 
However, these models currently provide a very wide range 
of estimates of adaptation costs. The outputs of two major 
models, AD-RICE and AD-WITCH, are presented in the 
Appendix available online, where the reasons for the wide 
divergence in model estimates are discussed.
In the future, one can expect these estimates to converge to 
some extent across the models, as parameter values become 
better determined empirically, and as the relationship 
between greenhouse-gas emissions, impacts and the 
effectiveness of adaptation become more firmly based on 
evidence. For the present, however, estimates of costs of 
adaptation have to rely mainly on bottom-up national studies 
and sectoral studies looking at specific types of impacts. 
2.3 NATIONAL AND SECTOR ESTIMATES OF 
THE COSTS OF ADAPTATION IN DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES
Most of the information base on the costs of adaptation 
at the national level has emerged from a small number of 
multi-country initiatives (Table 2.1).3 A growing number 
of individual-country or sector studies complement this 
3 The evidence presented in this section draws mostly on the ECON-
ADAPT project and its review work, funded by the European Union’s 
Seventh Framework Programme for Research, Technological Devel-
opment and Demonstration, under grant agreement nr. 603906.
information base. Not least, several NDCs include estimates 
of the costs of adaptation (Chapter 1) (UNEP 2015).
The various initiatives – and even the studies within them – 
are highly heterogeneous, which makes direct comparison 
difficult, and precludes a simple aggregation of these 
country-level studies into a global estimate for developing 
countries. The Appendix provides additional background on, 
and details about, the findings presented in the remainder of 
this section.
Acronym Name of the study Commissioner and reference
IFF Assessment of investment and financial flows to 
address climate change
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP 
2011)
EACC Economics of adaptation to climate change – 
country studies
World Bank (World Bank 2010)
NEEDS National economic, environment and 
development study
United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC 2010)
RECCS Regional economics of climate change Multiple organisations and references
Table 2.1: Multi-country studies on national adaptation costs in developing countries
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2.3.1 NATIONAL STUDIES
The IFF studies cover fifteen countries, and analyse one or 
two sectors in each country. The overall cost estimate is 
US$5.6 billion in 2020, US$6.3 billion in 2025, and US$7.1 
billion in 2030. For the agriculture sector alone, the combined 
cost estimate for twelve countries is US$2.8 billion in 2020, 
US$3.5 billion in 2025, and US$6.0 billion in 2030.
The EACC national studies cover seven countries and use the 
general impact-assessment framework applied in the same 
project to obtain a global estimate for developing countries. 
Nonetheless, national cost estimates are higher than the 
global estimate. For some countries, national cost estimates 
were ten-to-twenty per cent higher, mostly due to the 
consideration of socially contingent impacts. For countries 
like Ethiopia and Ghana, national estimates were higher still. 
The national studies also demonstrated that cost estimates 
rise strongly when a global warming scenario above 2°C 
is considered (for example, in the study for Mozambique, 
much higher costs were reported when high sea-level rise 
scenarios were considered).
The NEEDS project covered eight countries and assessed the 
short- and mid-term costs of adaptation based on financing 
needs. Although the various studies used different methods 
and targets over different time periods, they all consistently 
reported high estimates of the costs of adaptation. This is 
mainly due to the use of the needs-assessment approach.
To date, a further twenty-five individual national assessments 
or studies have been conducted.4 While most of these use 
impact-assessment approaches, comparing and synthesising 
estimates is challenging. What is interesting is that, for 
some countries, several independent studies have been 
conducted, which allows for cross-comparison. Examples of 
such countries are Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Ghana and India. 
In these countries, differences in adaptation costs between 
studies can vary by a factor of two-to-five.
2.3.2 SECTOR STUDIES
Previous reviews have assessed sector-specific studies of the 
costs of adaptation (IPCC 2014, OECD 2008). These reviews 
highlight that most studies focus on the coastal areas and 
agriculture sectors and, to a lesser extent, on the energy 
and infrastructure sectors. The recent European Union-
funded ECONADAPT project has reviewed the state of this 
literature (ECONADAPT 2015). The ECONADAPT findings 
are summarised here, and presented in more detail in the 
Appendix.
4 Details about these are included in the Appendix.
COASTAL AREAS
The most comprehensive estimates of the costs of 
adaptation are for the coastal areas sector, primarily with 
respect to the risks of sea-level rise and storm surges on 
flooding and erosion. These estimates have been produced 
as part of global impact-assessment studies, often using 
the DIVA model.5 Most of the global and national studies 
mentioned above also rely on this model.
The DIVA model has been used to estimate global annual 
investment and maintenance costs of protecting coasts 
up until 2100. The most recent estimates range from 
between US$12-31 billion to US$27-71 billion for low-and 
high-warming scenarios respectively (Hinkel et al. 2014). 
The additional adaptation costs associated with coastal 
erosion (beach and shore nourishment) are estimated at a 
further US$1.4-5.3 billion per year across low, mid and high 
scenarios (Hinkel et al. 2013). However, these results need to 
be considered in light of the discussion above: the studies 
assume modest protection levels, use an impact-assessment 
framework, and omit several risks related to the coastal and 
marine environment.
The case of coastal cities, which often require engineered 
protection, deserves particular attention. A global analysis of 
136 coastal cities reported indicative annual adaptation costs 
of US$350 million per city, or approximately US$50 billion 
annually in total (Hallegatte et al. 2013). The coastal sector 
is also leading the application of new approaches based 
on iterative risk management and decision making under 
uncertainty (ECONADAPT 2015).
WATER MANAGEMENT
A growing number of studies analyse the risks of more 
frequent and/or intense floods, and changes to the water 
supply-demand balance, including potential water deficits, 
and the costs of adapting. Over recent years, there has 
been a focus towards national and even basin-level studies. 
These allow the use of more detailed hydrological models, 
which can be linked to probability-loss functions or depth-
damage functions. More recent assessments also focus on 
low-regret adaptation options and non-technical options 
as complements to hard engineering, with early-warning 
systems and, increasingly, ecosystem-based approaches.
As with floods and changes in the water supply-demand 
balance, studies targeting water management and water 
demand are growing in number and tend to be national 
in scope. These often extend to risks that global studies 
typically omit, such as the costs of adapting wastewater and 
5 The DIVA model is an integrated research model of coastal systems 
that assesses biophysical and socio-economic consequences of 
sea-level rise and socio-economic development, taking into account 
coastal erosion, coastal flooding, wetland change, and salinity 
intrusion into deltas and estuaries, as well as adaptation in terms 
of raising dikes and nourishing shores and beaches. A complete 
description is available online at: http://www.diva-model.net/
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storm-water infrastructure, which can be high, or the costs 
associated with adaptation in hydro-electricity plants.
AGRICULTURE
The costs of adaptation in the agriculture sector, especially 
in developing countries, have been receiving increased 
attention. Both impact-assessment (crop modelling), and 
investment and financial flow studies are available, although 
these produce very different estimates, especially when the 
effects of trade are included. The most recent studies give 
greater consideration to early adaptation options, and focus 
on climate-smart agriculture (sustainable soil and water 
management practices).
HEAT IN THE CONTEXT OF THE BUILT ENVIRONMENT
A growing number of studies focus on heat, primarily in the 
urban environment. This risk cascades throughout multiple 
sectors: from the built environment (buildings), to energy 
use, and even human health. There are some studies of 
the potential increase in cooling demand and associated 
economic costs (increased air conditioning) under warmer 
climates (noting there are also other studies looking at the 
reduction in heating demand in cooler climates). Demand 
for cooling is expected to rise most strongly in South Asia, 
due to a combination of pre-existing high temperatures, 
increased warming and rising incomes. In India, for example, 
annual costs associated with additional demand for cooling 
could range between US$25 billion and US$100 billion 
by mid-century, for low- and high-warming scenarios, 
respectively (Mima et al. 2011). In addition, there are studies 
that look at the costs of alternatives to air conditioning, 
through passive systems, or building or spatial planning 
options. While these alternatives offer potential, they do 
require planned adaptation initiatives.
In OECD countries a recent focus has been on heat-alert 
health systems to address the potential risks of heat 
related mortality (especially from heat-waves). Such studies 
show that heat-alert systems are low-cost, high-benefit 
interventions; although with high warming, additional 
measures are needed to reduce residual risks.
SUMMING UP
In summary, the number of estimates of the costs (and 
benefits) of adaptation are growing. The literature reports 
increasing numbers of studies for coastal areas, water 
management, agriculture and the built environment, with 
additional studies in other areas. However, a concern is the 
lack of studies focused on the costs of adaptation in sectors 
such as ecosystems, or industry and services. Moreover, even 
in sectors where coverage is good, the full range of climate 
risks and adaptation options is partial, and the number 
of policy-orientated studies – which include practical 
application and implementation costs – is low.
Finally, more recent studies are considering the issue of 
uncertainty by using iterative climate risk management. This 
reflects a shift in the thinking around how to plan adaptation 
with uncertainty in mind, and such studies use a different 
analytical framework and provide a wider set of adaptation 
options, compared to early, technical and academic studies. 
What is clear from all these studies is that adaptation has 
the potential to be extremely beneficial and cost-effective 
when planned with uncertainty and implementation in mind 
(Section 2.4).
2.4 WHY COST ESTIMATES DIFFER
A number of factors influence the size of adaptation 
cost estimates. These factors are summarised below, to 
contextualise the estimates given in the previous section, 
and the reasons why they can differ substantially. Additional 
details are included in the Appendix.
2.4.1 COVERAGE
The costs of adaptation clearly depend on the coverage of 
sectors and risks. Studies with greater coverage will produce 
higher estimates, as they include a larger number of impacts. 
Comprehensive studies at the national level (for example, 
Ramsbottom et al. 2012) identify several hundred potential 
risks and opportunities from climate change. Nonetheless, 
most quantitative studies focus on a subset of the most 
important of these, mainly due to the complexity associated 
with quantifying and monetising impacts.
Existing estimates capture most of the key sectors, but not all. 
For example, biodiversity and ecosystem services are omitted 
and as a result, existing estimates understate the costs of 
adaptation.
The number and type of risks covered is a further issue. For 
example, studies focused on the agriculture sector tend to 
omit cash crops, horticulture and viniculture, and risks from 
changing pests and disease. Similarly, analyses of coastal 
zone risks typically cover coastal erosion and flooding, but 
neglect ocean acidification. The extent to which these 
omissions underestimate costs is difficult to ascertain. 
Previous critiques of the existing literature of global studies 
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have suggested a factor of two-to-three for the sectors 
considered (Parry et al. 2009):
We conclude that for coastal protection the factor of under-
estimation could be 2 to 3. For infrastructure it may be several 
times higher, at the lower end of the cost range. For health 
the ‘intervention sets’ that were costed related to a disease 
burden that is approximately 30-50% of the anticipated total 
burden in low- and middle-income countries (and do not 
include interventions in high-income countries). Including 
ecosystems protection could add a further $65-$300 billion 
per year in costs. Furthermore, estimates are not made for 
sectors such as mining and manufacturing, energy, the retail 
and financial sectors and tourism.
However, there are two additional issues. Firstly, direct climate 
change can often lead to indirect climate change impacts, 
which can amplify costs, especially when these lead to 
competition or constraints (such as with multiple demands 
for water). These may also include wider economic effects, 
although trade and market responses can often reduce cost 
increases.
The second issue relates to autonomous adaptation, as 
defined in Chapter 1. Most of the literature focuses on 
planned adaptation and omits autonomous adaptation. 
Examples of the latter include farm-level adaptation, 
the additional household energy costs associated with 
cooling, or adaptation action by the private sector. 
Including autonomous adaptation in the analysis of the 
costs of adaptation will increase cost estimates, potentially 
significantly.
2.4.2 OBJECTIVES AND QUANTIFICATION 
METHODS
Estimates of the costs of adaptation are influenced by the 
target, goal or objective chosen, as well as the degree of 
trade-off between the impacts of climate change, the costs 
of adaptation, and the residual costs after adaptation. Some 
studies may set objectives based on economic efficiency 
(that is, the optimal balance between costs, benefits and 
residual damages), while others may use levels of acceptable 
risk, which include a stronger consideration of equity (that 
is, setting a common protection level above which society 
considers risks unacceptable). These decisions entail careful 
consideration and interpretation of global equity concerns 
and international law provisions, especially when they 
apply to impacts in developing countries (due to their low 
responsibility for emissions, but high risks of impacts). These 
are contentious issues, on which views differ.
The available literature suggests that the choice of objective 
can lead to a factor of two-to-four difference in cost 
estimates. In terms of objectives, studies that adopt optimal 
frameworks produce lower cost estimates, compared to 
studies that use alternative methods (for example, using 
acceptable risks).
2.4.3 TIME-SCALES, AND FUTURE 
GREENHOUSE-GAS EMISSION PATHWAYS
The extent to which greenhouse-gas emissions will be 
mitigated in the future is unknown. The more emissions 
Photo: © Amir Jina
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are reduced, the less adaptation will be required. Therefore, 
estimates of the cost of adaptation differ with the 
assumptions made about future levels of greenhouse-gas 
emissions. Estimates are higher, even in early years, for higher 
scenarios of global warming. In addition, estimates of costs 
will differ with the assumptions made about future trends in 
socio-economic development. Socio-economic development 
can reduce future adaptation costs (for example, in situations 
where current vulnerabilities are reduced and/or adaptive 
capacities are increased), but it can also increase those costs 
(for example, as a result of poor planning, or as a consequence 
of rising asset prices). Similarly, adaptation costs vary strongly 
with expected economic growth.
2.4.4 UNCERTAINTY
Large uncertainties surround assumptions about the future 
emissions pathway the world is on – that is, a 2°C or 4°C 
world. Additional uncertainty arises due to the differences in 
the outputs of climate models. New approaches are being 
developed which allow decision-makers to factor these 
uncertainties into their planning, notably with iterative 
climate risk management, which encourages early, low-
regret options, robustness, flexibility and learning. Instead 
of focusing on one (or a small number of ) possible future 
projections, and suggesting adaptation strategies that are 
optimised for those conditions, newer approaches consider a 
range of plausible future conditions and propose adaptation 
strategies that can learn and evolve over time. Studies that 
include the consideration of uncertainty generally have 
higher costs when compared to studies that ignore it and 
implement optimal strategies, noting that in practice, the 
latter will lead to higher costs through maladaptation.
2.4.5 LIMITS OF ADAPTATION
Current estimates of the costs of adaptation assume that 
adaptation will be unconstrained. They further assume that, 
in terms of unit costs, adaptation will be similar for low and 
high global warming scenarios. In practice, however, there 
will be limits to adaptation (Klein et al. 2014), determined by 
physical and ecological constraints, technological limitations, 
information and cognitive barriers, and social and cultural 
barriers. Including these limits in estimates of the costs of 
adaptation will result in higher values. Not enough evidence 
is available to determine the extent of the increase, though it 
could be large.
2.4.6 AGGREGATION
Some studies analyse potential impacts and benefits from 
climate change, and aggregate the two (reading off residual 
damages against benefits). Such an approach is misleading, 
because it assumes that transfers will occur between those 
impacted by, and those benefiting from, climate change, which is 
very unlikely to take place in practice. For this reason, studies that 
allow aggregation are likely to report lower costs of adaptation.
2.4.7 ADAPTATION DEFICIT
The costs of adapting to climate change are determined 
by the size of the existing adaptation gap – that is, the 
difference between the costs of adaptation and the financing 
available to meet them at a given point in time. The costs 
of bridging this gap may not be considered adaptation, 
because they overlap to a great extent with developmental 
activities. However, unless this deficit is overcome first, 
adaptation will be less effective (Burton 2004). It follows that 
the estimates from studies that ignore the adaptation deficit 
are over-optimistic.
2.4.8 ADDITIONAL COST CATEGORIES  
AND SOFT VERSUS HARD ADAPTATION
Most current studies focus on the technical (engineering) 
costs of delivering adaptation and overlook opportunity and 
transaction costs. As a result, the estimates from technical 
studies are low. This mirrors a similar finding in the climate 
change mitigation domain, where ex-post cost outcomes 
were found to be higher than implied by technical (ex-ante) 
cost curves.
However, alternatives to more costly technical adaptation 
technologies are available. These include non-technological 
options that may offer wider co-benefits (Agrawala et al. 
2011b). They can also include alternative strategies, such 
as insurance (risk pooling), which can reduce the costs 
of adaptation. While these alterative adaptation options 
are often low-cost, implementing them requires certain 
institutional capacity and mechanisms, which also have a cost.
2.4.9 LEARNING, INNOVATION, SCALE  
AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR
Costs fall with learning and innovation, and with the scale 
of implementation. In many cases, existing costs can 
therefore be considered overestimates. However, in areas 
such as coastal protection and irrigation, adaptation relies 
on existing technological solutions and practices, where 
learning and efficiencies of scale have already taken place. 
Notwithstanding, more effective and innovative delivery of 
adaptation by the private sector would reduce adaptation 
costs.
2.4.10 IMPLEMENTATION COSTS  
AND EFFECTIVENESS
The actual implementation of adaptation (including 
design, management and execution), as well as the 
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Figure 2.2: Changes in adaptation costs and residual impacts
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need for monitoring and reporting, all lead to additional 
costs that many technical studies ignore. For the least-
developed countries, there are also additional governance 
challenges, which will affect the effectiveness of adaptation. 
These challenges reduce the benefits, and thus the cost 
effectiveness, of adaptation, or else require additional costs 
for management agents or intermediaries to ensure effective 
delivery.
The latter is important, as many current estimates tend to 
assume a high level of transferability (that is, options that 
will show similar effectiveness in very different countries 
and contexts). However, experience from development 
economics suggests that this is not the case: insufficient 
maintenance, lack of finance, and a range of behavioural 
barriers all reduce effectiveness. As a result, adaptation 
benefits are lower than anticipated (and residual damage 
levels are higher).
On the basis of the evidence summarised in the previous 
paragraphs, Figure 2.2 shows the indicative influence of each 
individual component on adaptation costs. In each case, a 
broad range is indicated, because the evidence on the scale 
of the effect is limited. In practice, the range will vary with 
each specific study, as a result of both the choices made and 
the approach adopted.
The combined effect of the various factors above has a large 
influence on estimates of the costs of adaptation. Indeed, 
even small or limited changes in only one component can 
change estimates significantly. For example, both the EACC 
and UNFCCC studies (Table 2.1) estimated the costs of 
adaptation in coastal areas and, to do so, both relied on the 
same model. However, changes in assumptions about unit 
costs and maintenance costs, and inclusion of port-upgrading 
costs, resulted in a five-fold difference in the final estimate. 
Furthermore, even when a conservative choice is used in one 
area (for example, a strong equity assumption), cost estimates 
can still be lower if other choices favour lower-cost outcomes.
Studies that include more practical-based assessments report 
higher adaptation costs. This arises because of the inclusion 
of implementation costs, but also because these studies tend 
to include higher warming scenarios, consider uncertainty, 
and set objectives based on existing standards. Further work 
to isolate the impact of each individual factor would allow for 
comparisons across studies. While in principle this is possible, 
it is challenging to do so in practice (Box 2.1).
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2.5 MOVING TOWARD PRACTICE
While the volume of climate finance, as illustrated in the 
next chapter, is increasing, it is likely to fall short of potential 
needs. For this reason, it will be important to ensure that 
available funds have the greatest possible impact. To this 
end, and in addition to other goals, such as maximising the 
number of beneficiaries, prioritising the most vulnerable, 
or delivering the highest value for money, prioritising 
adaptation will be of the utmost importance.
Prioritisation of adaptation involves some major challenges, 
not least due to the profile of cost and benefits over time, 
especially for planned adaptation. In addition, the high level 
of uncertainty surrounding adaptation makes choosing the 
exact form of intervention difficult, while potential benefits 
are highly site- and context-specific.
Reflecting these challenges, in recent years the framing 
of adaptation has shifted toward early-implementation 
practices (ECONADAPT 2015). Firstly, there has been a 
move toward a policy-orientated approach for assessing 
adaptation, in which the objectives are framed around key 
problems. This adaptation assessment approach contrasts 
with traditional science-first, impact-assessment approaches. 
Secondly, greater emphasis is being put on integrating 
adaptation into current policy and development, rather than 
treating adaptation as a stand-alone activity. This process 
is often referred to as mainstreaming (integration). Thirdly, 
there has been a move to consider the phasing and timing of 
adaptation, due to an increasing recognition of uncertainty. 
This has translated into different types of adaptation 
interventions, addressing current climate variability and 
future climate change, undertaken within the framework 
of iterative climate risk management and decision-making 
under uncertainty.6
As a result, greater emphasis is increasingly being put 
on early adaptation actions, low-regret options, capacity 
building, and options that build-in flexibility and robustness 
for long-term decisions, complemented with early planning 
for major future risks (with research, monitoring and 
learning). A key implication of this is that there is a need 
for studies of the costs of adaptation to focus on the above 
aspects, and to provide information that helps prioritise, and 
implement, adaptation actions.
6 For further details, the reader is referred to the Appendix.
Box 2.1: Improving estimates of the costs of adaptation
As outlined in the previous paragraphs, a wide range of factors influence estimates of the costs of adaptation. 
The following are examples of activities that, if undertaken, would help improve estimates:
•  More empirical studies, covering sectors or risks that are currently poorly studied.
• Sensitivity testing and multi-model analyses, and other methods that can help determine how the choice of 
methods and assumptions affects estimates.
• Ex-post analyses of existing or early adaptation practices, to learn about opportunity, transaction and 
implementation costs.
• Analyses of the transferability of options, both between locations and in terms of aggregation of impacts.
• Sharing of available information and lessons learnt.
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3.1 INTRODUCTION
Adaptation finance is a central element to the international 
response to climate change, as recognised in many decisions 
by the CoP to the UNFCCC. Comprehensive and up-to-date 
information about finance flows, based on internationally 
agreed methodologies, is essential to inform national 
adaptation policy, and support investment decisions. 
However, at present this information is only partially available.
This chapter synthesises available information on financing 
flows for adaptation, while highlighting data gaps. The 
remainder of the chapter is structured around two sections: a 
description of the quantitative evidence available regarding 
adaptation finance, and an overview of opportunities for 
scaling-up adaptation finance and improving finance flow 
tracking systems.
Furthermore, it is worth recalling that the UNFCCC articulates 
its finance commitment (US$100 billion annually by 2020, 
to be increased after 2025) without specifying the share that 
public or private actors are expected to provide. For this 
reason, the estimates presented in this chapter should be 
interpreted in a broad sense, rather than simply compared 
against the UNFCCC finance commitment (Box 3.1).
Box 3.1: Progress toward meeting the US$100 billion finance commitment
The UNFCCC has called on its developed country parties to provide US$100 billion annually by 2020 for climate 
action in developing countries. However, there is no agreement as to the type of funding that shall be mobilised 
to meet this goal, and financing is expected to come from “…a wide variety of sources, public and private, bilateral 
and multilateral, including alternative sources” (UNFCCC 2010). This uncertainty has hampered efforts to monitor 
progress toward meeting the goal, despite recent efforts to improve tracking for climate finance.
A 2015 assessment entitled Climate finance in 2013-14 and the US$100 billion goal by the OECD reported that climate 
finance volumes flowing from developed to developing countries that might qualify to meet the US$100 billion 
goal amounted to an annual average of US$57 billion in the period between 2013 and 2014 (OECD 2015a). Of 
this, about US$9.3 billion was directed to adaptation, and a further US$3.7 billion was directed to dual adaptation-
mitigation projects (OECD 2015a).
Public climate finance provided by donor governments accounts for the majority of the US$9.3 billion. However, it 
also incorporates public financial interventions from developed countries that have mobilised private funding for 
climate-related projects (OECD 2015a). Of the small fraction of private sector finance that can be tracked today, less 
than ten per cent is directed to climate change adaptation.
KEY FINDINGS
• In 2014, international public finance for climate change adaptation amounted to at least US$25 billion globally, of 
which US$22.5 billion were directed to developing countries. This represents a marginal increase compared to 2013, 
but a continued increase since 2010.
• A proper measurement, tracking, and reporting system of adaptation investments is indispensable to ensure that 
finance is used efficiently and targeted where it is most needed. Progress has been made with regard to harmonising 
concepts and accounting practices, as well as understanding the links between public and private finance. 
Nonetheless, further improvements are needed, including (i) increasing efforts to further enhance comparability 
across different financial flows; and (ii) evaluating the effect of development interventions that, while having a 
different primary goal, bring adaptation co-benefits.
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3.2 AN OVERVIEW OF ADAPTATION FINANCE 
LEVELS AND TRENDS
This section presents the most up-to-date estimates of public 
financial flows directed to reducing vulnerability to climate 
change. This includes activities ranging from information 
and knowledge generation, to development of human and 
institutional capacities, to planning and implementation of 
climate change adaptation actions.7
Beyond certain commitments by national DFIs, no 
consistent figures are available documenting public sector 
budgets for domestic adaptation action. This is due to 
the lack of systematic tracking and difficulties associated 
with attributing adaptation functions to national or local 
budgets which, while performing those functions, may also 
serve other purposes and may have been approved on 
developmental grounds.
Similarly, no data are available on private sector financing 
for adaptation. This is because investment databases lack 
the contextual information needed to identify whether 
an investment has any relevance to adaptation. Not 
least, while households and corporations do engage in 
adaptation activities – most likely as a reaction to observed 
impacts, rather than as a forward-looking strategy aimed at 
anticipating projected changes – they do not typically label 
their actions as adaptation, because they tend to consider 
climate risk as part of their broader risk management 
processes (Averchenkova et al. 2015).
In short, the estimates presented in this chapter 
underestimate the volume of finance flowing to adaptation 
by an unknown amount, corresponding to the volumes 
of both public financing for domestic adaptation, and 
private sector financing for both domestic and international 
7 For details on definitions the reader is referred to the following 
sources: IDFC-MDBs (2015), IDFC (2014), UNFCCC (2014) and OECD 
(2011).
adaptation. The volumes of finance that are tracked, and 
presented in the chapter, correspond to commitments by the 
following providers of climate finance:
• Development finance institutions: multi-lateral, bilateral, 
national and sub-national development banks.
• Governments and their bilateral aid agencies, as recorded 
in the creditor reporting system, administered by the 
OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC).8
• Dedicated climate change funds.
8 The creditor reporting system inventories adaptation finance flows 
from bilateral donors (irrespective of whether or not they are mem-
bers of the OECD’s DAC), multilateral organisations, and specialised 
climate change funds. The coverage of climate funds is not compre-
hensive. Additional details are available online at: http://www.oecd.
org/development/stats/rioconventions.htm.
Adaptation Finance in the Paris Agreement
The Paris Agreement contains three provisions that are of particular relevance to adaptation finance. Firstly, the 
agreement urges developed countries to “significantly increase adaptation finance from current levels”. Secondly, in an 
effort to advance toward an agreed definition of what qualifies as climate finance under the UNFCCC, the Agreement 
requested one of the convention’s subsidiary bodies to develop modalities for the accounting of financial resources 
provided and mobilised through public interventions. Such an effort is expected to increase the accountability of 
financial pledges for climate change. Thirdly, the agreement renews, from the highest level, the political commitment 
for a (low-carbon and) climate-resilient economy. In doing so, it strengthens the position of first-mover investors and 
financiers, and represents a call to action for laggards.
3.2.1 PUBLIC ADAPTATION FINANCE 
FLOWS
Globally, public adaptation finance amounted to between 
US$23 billion and US$26 billion in 2014, or US$25 billion 
globally on average (Buchner et al. 2015). This accounts for 
17 per cent of all public climate finance committed in 2014. 
About US$22.5 billion (90 per cent of the total US$25 billion) 
was directed to developing countries.
Adaptation finance volumes have been increasing since 
2010, the first year for which data are available (Figure 3.1).9  
The amount is similar to that of 2013, but still represents an 
increase in adaptation-related bilateral development finance.
9 The OECD Rio marker for adaptation was introduced in 2010. Buch-
ner et al. (2011) represents the first attempt at summarising climate 
finance flows. Data from multi-lateral development banks was first 
collated in 2012.
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In 2014, climate change-related ODA accounted for 19 per 
cent of overall ODA, increasing from five per cent in 2005. The 
share of adaptation-related ODA to overall ODA grew from 7 
per cent in 2010 to 10 per cent in 2014.1011
10 We draw primarily on Buchner et al. (2015), which uses a mix of 2013 
and 2014 data, depending on data availability at the time the report 
was prepared. However, for simplicity, we label the most recent 
estimates as 2014, even when some of the figures making up the 
aggregated estimate refer to 2013.
11 For additional details, the reader is referred to Buchner et al. (2015), 
which contains a full description of the methodology. The meth-
odology relies on the tracking standards and reporting approaches 
used by the members of the OECD’s DAC, the group of multi-lateral 
banks that report jointly on climate change finance volumes, the 
members of the International Development Finance Club, and the 
various funds dedicated to climate change.
3.2.2 KEY SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL 
PUBLIC ADAPTATION FINANCE
Multilateral, bilateral, and domestic DFIs provided US$21 
billion of the US$25 billion total of adaptation finance for 
both developed and developing countries. Direct public 
contributions from governments, ministries, and bilateral 
agencies made up an additional US$3 billion, whereas 
dedicated climate funds provided another US$1 billion (see 
Box 3.2) (Buchner et al. 2015). In 2014, adaptation-related 
bilateral ODA financing reached US$12.4 billion, with over 
two-thirds of this amount having adaptation as a significant 
objective (Figure 3.2).12 Most of these sums are invested 
directly in projects, as opposed, for example, to sector-
12 This figure includes commitments from bilateral DFIs such as 
France’s AFD, Germany’s KfW, and Japan’s JICA. To avoid double 
counting, in CPI’s estimates above these commitments are netted 
out as tracked under the DFIs category.
Figure 3.1: Global international adaptation-related public finance
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The adaptation finance flows documented in this section refer to annual financial commitments made in the latest 
available year.10 The estimates presented are drawn from the Climate Policy Initiative’s Global Landscape of Climate 
Finance (Buchner et al. 2015), and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) databases.11
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Figure 3.2: Adaptation-related bilateral ODA of DAC members
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Source: based on OECD (2015b)
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budget support. The European Union, France, Germany, 
Japan and the United States are the main providers of official 
development assistance for climate change adaptation.
It is worth noting that DFIs, bilateral donors and specialised 
climate change funds provide financing for activities that 
have adaptation co-benefits, even though this is not the 
primary goal of these activities. Examples of these are 
projects aimed at supporting climate change mitigation, 
disaster-risk reduction, or ecosystem-based services. 
The trade-offs and synergies between the adaptation 
objectives and the primary goal of these activities remain 
poorly understood (IPCC 2014), and adaptation co-benefits 
derived from financing other development activities remain 
unknown. This has implications for current estimations of 
international public finance flows for adaptation, as the 
inability to capture financing for co-benefits could lead to 
underestimation.
3.2.3 KEY INSTRUMENTS CHANNELLING 
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC ADAPTATION 
FINANCE
In 2014, for both developed and developing countries, public 
actors extended US$18 billion out of a total of US$25 billion 
directed to climate change adaptation (in the form of low-
cost loans, including concessional loans, and grants). Market-
rate loans accounted for most of the rest. Table 3.1 gives a 
summary of key instruments, by source.
In addition to established instruments, such as loans and 
grants, new financing approaches are emerging to channel 
international public adaptation finance, as the following two 
illustrative examples show:
• In 2015, with financing from the Pilot Programme for 
Climate Resilience, the European Bank for Reconstruction 
Sources Main instrument (share of total)
Official development assistance Grants (66 per cent) and loans (32 per cent)
Bilateral development finance institutions Low-cost loans (80 per cent)
Multi-lateral development finance institutions13 Market-rate loans (84 per cent)
Table 3.1: Adaptation finance sources and instruments
13 Multilateral DFIs often combine their loans with concessional financing, including from dedicated climate change funds.
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Box 3.2: Dedicated adaptation funds
Dedicated climate change funds provide finance in the form of grants, loans or other instruments at more 
advantageous terms than those provided by commercial lenders or DFIs. This is one of the features that allow 
climate change funds to support multi-lateral development banks, as well as other implementing entities, with 
regard to breaking down financial and non-financial barriers that deter investment in climate change adaptation.
Adaptation is the focus of six climate change funds (Figure 3.3). At present, the US$1.2 billion Pilot Programme 
for Climate Resilience and the almost US$1 billion Least Developed Countries Fund are the largest among these 
adaptation-targeted climate funds.14
Source: ODI (2016)
To date, a total of 76 per cent of the resources pledged to adaptation-dedicated funds have been approved for 
disbursement (ODI 2016). Disbursement rates vary depending on factors such as (i) time-lags associated with fund 
programming procedures, (ii) difficulties in developing project pipelines, and (iii) limited absorptive capacity in 
recipient country government agencies.15 Overall, funds’ financial commitments to projects have increased over the 
period between 2011 and 2014 (Buchner et al. 2015).
The Green Climate Fund (not pictured in Figure 3.3) entered into operation recently. Given its stated goal of seeking 
a balanced allocation of resources between adaptation- and mitigation-focused activities, this fund is expected to 
play a significant role in adaptation funding in coming years. In late 2015, the fund approved about US$109 million 
for four adaptation projects out of a total of US$168 million in funding—in other words, nearly 65 per cent of total 
funding from the Green Climate Fund (GCF) has been approved for adaptation. In February 2016, it set up the 
aspirational target of investing US$2.5 billion during 2016 (for both mitigation and/or adaptation projects).16
Concerns have been raised about the need for climate funds to improve the timeliness and completeness of their 
reporting. For example, a recent analysis of climate funds found that, of five adaptation-focused funds reviewed, 
two had not reported on whether or not they had achieved their expected results, whereas the other three 
reported underperformance against their expected results (ODI and HBS 2015).
14 Thus far the Pilot Programme for Climate Resilience has focused on integrating adaptation into national development planning, and supporting 
business models that promote private sector engagement in adaptation projects. The Least Developed Countries Fund has helped to fund the 
preparation of National Adaptation Programmes of Action, among other adaptation projects.
15 Data availability from each fund will also affect the apparent rate at which finance is approved, as funds report on different timescales.
16 Press release available online: http://www.greenclimate.fund/documents/20182/38417/Green_Climate_Fund_approves_first_8_investments.
pdf/679227c6-c037-4b50-9636-fec1cd7e8588
Figure 3.3: Adaptation-dedicated climate funds
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and Development launched a climate resilience financing 
facility. The facility works with local financial institutions 
to provide adaptation financing worth US$10 million to 
Tajik households, businesses and farmers.
• In 2014, during its first cycle, the Global Lab for Climate 
Finance crowdsourced over thirty innovative adaptation 
finance concepts.17 In 2015, three concepts were further 
developed. They concern the issuance of water bonds 
as a means of managing water infrastructure in water-
stressed regions, and the provision of data and analysis 
for improving farmers’ access to finance for climate-smart 
agriculture investments, and to increase climate resilience 
by facilitating the penetration of insurance.
17 For further details the reader is referred to the Global Lab for Climate 
Finance’s website (climatefinancelab.org), and Trabacchi and Mazza 
(2015), which presents the Agricultural Supply Chain Adaptation 
Facility that the Lab endorsed.
3.2.4 SECTORAL USES AND GEOGRAPHICAL 
DISTRIBUTION OF INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 
ADAPTATION FINANCE
In 2014, water and wastewater management projects 
attracted about half of the total volume of (tracked) 
international public adaptation finance provided that year. 
The agriculture and land-use sector followed with an average 
of US$3 billion. Water, wastewater and agriculture were 
among the most commonly prioritised sectors in the NDCs 
prepared by parties to the UNFCCC (UNEP 2015). 
In 2014, about 90 per cent of all international public 
adaptation finance was allocated to non-OECD countries. 
The regions that benefitted the most were East Asia and the 
Pacific (46 per cent of the total), sub-Saharan Africa (14 per 
cent), Latin America and the Caribbean (12 per cent), and 
South Asia (9 per cent). In the same year, the top recipients 
of adaptation-related bilateral ODA were India, Myanmar, the 
Philippines, and Vietnam.
Photo: © Johannes Carolus
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3.3 TRACKING ADAPTATION FINANCE
Over the past ten years, significant progress has been 
made in tracking international adaptation finance. Three 
achievements deserve particular attention: increased data 
comparability, improved data accessibility, and expanded 
knowledge on the linkages between public and private 
finance.
3.3.1 INCREASED DATA COMPARABILITY
Accounting and reporting methodologies are increasingly 
being harmonised, thereby ensuring greater comparability 
across data from different institutions. The common 
principles for tracking adaptation finance, agreed by a range 
of international, regional and national financial institutions, 
are central to this endeavour (IDFC-MDB 2015).18 Not least, in 
April 2016, the OECD adopted an improved definition of the 
Rio Marker for tracking bilateral ODA targeting adaptation.19 
This updated version, included in the revised statistical 
reporting directives of the OECD DAC, is complemented by a 
guidance table, with examples of eligibility criteria for every 
sector and detailed guidance on how to use the marker.
3.3.2 IMPROVED DATA ACCESSIBILITY
The creditor reporting system, administered by the OECD’s 
DAC, is contributing to improving the accessibility of data 
on international adaptation finance.20 The system brings 
together data from 24 OECD countries (out of a total of 
32 countries), a range of multi-lateral development banks, 
and most multi-lateral climate change funds, totalling 17 
institutions. In addition, it currently gathers (mitigation and) 
adaptation financial flows, and data on official development 
flows (non-official development assistance) for eight 
countries and the European Union institutions.
3.3.3 EXPANDED KNOWLEDGE ON THE 
LINKAGES BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 
FINANCE
In an effort to better understand how public funds can 
help mobilise private financing for adaptation, a number of 
bilateral and multi-lateral DFIs have begun to collect and 
18 Complementing this effort, a larger number of financial institutions 
have adopted five voluntary principles, with the aim of further inte-
grating climate change concerns into their project portfolios (World 
Bank 2015).
19 This definition is aligned with the joint tracking methodology used 
by multi-lateral development banks and the International Develop-
ment Finance Club.
20 It is worth noting that, over the years, the system has improved in 
terms of data quality and coverage.
report estimates of the amounts of private finance raised 
through their operations.21 Drawing on this information, 
the OECD and the Climate Policy Initiative are outlining a 
methodology for estimating private-sector finance flows 
mobilised by developed country, public sector-funded 
interventions in developing countries (Brown et al. 2015). 
The GCF also looks at private finance mobilised through their 
operations.
Notwithstanding the efforts described above, major 
impediments stand in the way of comprehensive tracking of 
adaptation finance. The close linkages between adaptation 
finance and development finance represent one such 
impediment: most adaptation actions rarely represent stand-
alone interventions, as they are typically integrated into 
broader public or private sector operations. For this reason, 
identifying and classifying investments is challenging.22
As noted earlier, very little quantitative information is 
available regarding public sector funding for domestic 
adaptation, and private sector financing for adaptation. 
These data gaps prevent us from obtaining a fuller picture of 
adaptation finance flows.
The volume of public sector finance directed to domestic 
adaptation measures is unknown, both in developed and 
developing countries (see Box 3.3). A series of national 
studies highlight that, in developing countries, the share of 
the public sector’s budget allocated to adaptation ranges 
between nil and 13 per cent (CPEIR 2015).23 These and other 
studies show that domestic spending on climate change 
tends to be much higher for adaptation than for mitigation 
(World Bank 2012, Bird 2014).
Only indirect evidence is available concerning the volume of 
private sector financing for adaptation. For example, recent 
multi-lateral development-bank investments in support of 
private adaptation worth US$270 million made 26 private 
sector projects (with a total value of US$5.5 billion) more 
climate resilient (Vivid Economics 2015). 
21 Private co-finance at the project level is the proxy used by most 
financial institutions to estimate the level of private sector finance 
mobilised with public sector financing. The reader is referred to, for 
example, Brown et al. (2015), IDFC-MDBs (2015), and Stumhofer et al. 
(2015).
22 This leads to under-reporting of the level of financing that influenc-
es adaptation. Nonetheless, over-reporting has also been observed 
(Terpstra et al. 2013).
23 The studies, dubbed climate public expenditure reviews, were con-
ducted by the United Nations Development Programme. For each 
country, the studies provide three-year averages for the latest set of 
three contiguous data points available.
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Public sector budgets can be used to mobilise additional 
private sector financing for adaptation. Key mechanisms for 
doing so include:
• Adjusting regulatory frameworks, to create stronger 
incentives for private sector engagement.
• Giving businesses access to the information and tools 
they need to integrate adaptation into investment 
decisions.
• Integrating climate change considerations into the 
financial system. 
• Demonstrating approaches, to create a track record 
that helps increase market confidence and, therefore, 
encourage investment.
Box 3.3: Public sector funding for domestic adaptation in developed countries
Most developed countries take an integrated approach to adaptation and only a few earmark funds for 
adaptation-specific activities (Mullan et al. 2013). Earmarked budgets are primarily used for enhancing the enabling 
environment for adaptation, rather than implementing specific adaptation measures. For example, France has 
estimated that EUR 171 million (US$190 million) will be required to implement the national adaptation plan, 
whereas Canada has set aside CAD 149 million (US$114 million) for the period from 2011 to 2016 (OECD 2015c). 
Exceptions to this are, for instance, the European Union’s financial instrument for the environment, which makes 
available co-financing worth EUR 190 million (US$215 million) for adaptation-specific activities in the period 
between 2014 and 2020, or the disaster-risk reduction funds operating in Japan and Mexico, among other 
countries.
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The Adaptation Finance Gap Report    31
CHAPTER 4
PRIVATE SECTOR 
FINANCE FOR 
ADAPTATION 
LEAD AUTHORS
AARON ATTERIDGE (STOCKHOLM ENVIRONMENT 
INSTITUTE), PIETER PAUW (GERMAN DEVELOPMENT 
INSTITUTE), PIETER TERPSTRA (NETHERLANDS 
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS)
CONTRIBUTING AUTHORS (alphabetical)
FABIO BEDINI (WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME), 
LORENZO BOSSI (WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME), 
CECILIA COSTELLA (WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME)
Photo: © Stuart Price (AMISOM)
32   Chapter 4 | Private sector finance for adaptation
4.1 INTRODUCTION
An emphasis on private finance has emerged in climate 
finance discussions, particularly in the context of 
international climate change negotiations. This is partly 
because the overall volume of finance needed to support 
adaptation in developing countries (Chapter 2) is beyond 
what many expect public finance to be able to contribute.
Despite this emphasis, the depth of empirical analysis on the 
contribution of private finance to adaptation outcomes is 
limited (Surminsky 2013, Pauw et al. 2015). The growing body 
of literature on this issue covers four main areas:
• Assessments that seek to identify, and even quantify, 
private investment relevant to climate change 
(Buchner et al. 2015, Brown et al. 2015).24
• Reviews of experiences by multi-lateral development 
banks providing finance to the private sector for 
adaptation-related expenditure (Vivid Economics 2015, 
Eurodad 2015). 
• Assessments of private financing for adaptation-relevant 
concepts, such as climate-proofing (UNEPFI 2014) or 
resilience (Trabacchi and Mazza 2015).25
• Descriptions of cases in which the private sector provides 
financing for adaptation, such as the UNFCCC Private 
Sector Initiative (Pauw et al. 2015).
24 These studies underline the difficulties in defining what constitutes 
adaptation-relevant finance.
25 Notwithstanding the usefulness of these efforts, they represent 
narrow proxies for assessing the extent to which the private sector 
can help bridge the adaptation finance gap.
The literature does not allow for a proper definition of 
the private sector’s contribution to the financing of, and 
expenditure on, adaptation-related outcomes. In light of this, 
the goal of this chapter is to outline issues of relevance when 
considering the prospects of private sector financing for 
adaptation in developing countries (Box 4.1).
The chapter considers private sector financing for adaptation 
in general, as opposed to a narrower focus on the extent to 
which the private sector contributes to meeting international 
climate finance goals.26 Not least, it is important to note 
from the outset the sensitivities that frame any discussion of 
the contribution of private sector finance to adaptation in 
developing countries:
• The emphasis on private sector finance is dominant 
in neoliberal (often Western) political economies. 
However, countries and communities with different 
political economies might have other perspectives as 
to what level and type of private investment is desirable 
and appropriate. Stated differently, the concept that 
mobilising private sector financing for adaptation is a 
goal may not be shared by all.
• Bridging the adaptation finance gap is not only a 
question of mobilising more resources: discussions about 
both public and private sector finance should be set 
against a background of effective delivery. In other words, 
it matters how finance connects with the priorities and 
26 Specifically, the developed countries’ pledge under the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change to mobilise 
US$100 billion in climate finance annually by 2020, to support devel-
oping countries with adaptation and mitigation.
KEY FINDINGS
• Assessing the extent to which private sector financing contributes to increasing resilience in developing countries 
is challenging because (i) data are scarce, (ii) the effectiveness of private sector investments is unclear, and (iii) the 
extent to which private sector finance incentivises maladaptation is unknown.
• There are indications that, perhaps with the exception of remittances, the international private sector is unlikely to be 
a major source of adaptation finance in the most vulnerable countries. In these countries the emphasis should be on 
strengthening the domestic private sector, as this sector is often dependent upon resources that are vulnerable to 
climate change.
• Remittances are an increasingly important source of external finance in many developing countries, and could play 
an important role in supporting household-level adaptation.
• International public finance can help mobilise domestic private investment in developing countries, provided that 
the right incentives and policies are introduced.
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Box 4.1: Key challenges in assessing private sector financing for adaptation
Unlike bilateral and multi-lateral donors, who have to report on their adaptation-related investments, the private 
sector has no obligation to do so. For this reason, data on financial transactions involving the private sector 
generally tend to be unavailable. Therefore, the scant data collected in commercial databases understates the 
actual level of private sector financing for adaptation (Agrawala et al. 2011, Pauw 2015).
Private investments in adaptation can create public benefits. However, the private sector is not accountable for 
creating them. As a result, the extent to which private sector financing for adaptation is delivered effectively, and 
how it affects regulatory efficiency and distributional equity, is unclear. Public sector expenditure for adaptation 
outcomes can help increase the accountability of private sector financing for adaptation, by creating enabling 
conditions that incentivise the right kind of private sector investment.
While some (private sector) finance flows may support adaptation priorities, other flows may erode community 
resilience and reduce adaptive capacity. Identifying the latter is particularly relevant in the case of private sector 
investments, due to the lack of accountability mentioned above, as well as for informing public responses and 
frameworks for private action.
needs of recipient countries and communities, and how 
lasting the outcomes are.
At present, the debate about private financing for adaptation 
focuses on climate-proofing in the infrastructure, water and 
agriculture sectors. Such a focus on responding to impacts 
is arguably too narrow, and neglects key pre-conditions 
for adaptation, notably those related to human health and 
ecosystem resilience. For this reason, further consideration of 
the private sector’s potential to facilitate investment at scale 
in such public goods is warranted.
The remainder of the chapter is structured around two 
sections. The first section summarises the information 
available regarding private sector financing for adaptation 
in developing countries, with a focus on climate bonds, 
remittances and domestic private investment. The second 
section outlines financial and non-financial tools that can be 
used to mobilise private sector financing for adaptation in 
developing countries.
4.2 EVIDENCE ABOUT PRIVATE SECTOR 
FINANCING FOR ADAPTATION 
In addition to ODA, foreign direct investment, portfolio 
equity, private debt, and remittances make up the largest 
components of financial inflows to developing countries.27 
Although there are no quantitative estimates of the 
adaptation-relevance of these flows (Chapter 3), there are 
some indications of their potential relevance as outlined in 
the following paragraphs.
27 Least-developed countries generally receive very little foreign 
direct investment, equity, debt and remittances. In per-capita terms, 
upper-middle income countries receive substantially more foreign 
direct investment, and public and private debt, compared to all 
other countries.
4.2.1 CLIMATE BONDS
 
Over the last decade interest has grown in using bonds 
to raise capital specifically for climate change and 
environmental objectives – climate bonds, and green bonds, 
respectively. Bonds can raise capital for either private or 
public expenditure, depending on who issues the bonds 
in the market. It is estimated that 4.3 per cent of the 
US$65.9 billion outstanding green bonds are linked  
to climate adaptation projects (CBI 2015), while a 
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larger percentage are in sectors that may be relevant for 
adaptation.28
At present, there are no international standards for 
delineating green bonds from other bonds, and questions 
have been raised as to whether the apparent rapid growth in 
green bond finance actually generates new capital for green 
investments, or instead reflects a re-labelling of traditional 
bonds and investments. Further analysis is therefore needed 
to properly explore the potential of the bond market 
to substantially contribute new capital to adaptation 
investment flows in developing countries.
28 For example, local governments in the United States have issued 
green bonds for investment in water management. Among other 
interventions, these bonds finance the widening of storm water 
tunnels and more efficient waste-water treatment (CBI, 2015).
4.2.2 REMITTANCES
The value of remittances to developing countries is expected 
to increase to US$516 billion in 2016 (World Bank 2015). 
This is roughly 3.5 times the size of total ODA flowing to 
developing countries in 2015 (OECD 2016), illustrating 
the importance of remittances for developing countries’ 
economy, for individual households, and for small businesses 
and entrepreneurs. Remittances may be valuable from an 
adaptation-perspective because they tend to increase, for 
instance, in the case of catastrophic weather events, natural 
disasters or economic crises in the migrants’ country of 
origin. Furthermore, remittances reach households directly, 
including those in remote and vulnerable areas, more so than 
public finance flows (Bendandi and Pauw 2016).
Remittances can help fund adaptation-related investments 
ranging from short-term priorities, such as irrigation 
equipment, to longer-term goals related to health and 
education. For example, in water-stressed communities 
in the Himalayas, remittances can be an important source 
Figure 4.1: Tools for mobilising private sector financing for adaptation
Source: UNEP (2014)
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Box 4.2: Barriers to private sector financing for adaptation
Private sector financing for adaptation faces many of the same generic barriers to private sector investment 
in developing countries, which climate change could magnify. In addition, it faces barriers that are specific to 
adaptation to climate change:
• Long-term planning needs. The long time-scales and uncertainties inherent in climate change are at 
odds with the much shorter time horizons within which most businesses operate when making investment 
decisions (Danielson and Scott 2006).
• Unclear costs and benefits. While adaptation is often framed as a measure to reduce future costs, 
businesses tend to invest in actions that promote expansion and increase revenue, rather than in cost-
saving measures (UNEPFI 2014).
• Limited autonomous earning power. Some kinds of adaptation, such as infrastructure projects, may 
offer limited autonomous earning power for the investor, which is a barrier particularly for attracting equity 
(UNEPFI 2014).
• Social and cultural barriers. Adaptation is essentially a social change process, and social and cultural 
factors may resist change, as evidenced, for instance, in the context of community adaptation to extreme 
weather events (IFRC 2014).
These kinds of barriers are especially challenging for small- and medium-sized enterprises, whose ability 
to understand the implications of climate change is limited, compared to that of larger businesses 
(Stenek et al. 2013, Ballard et al. 2013). In addition, small- and medium-sized enterprises have more limited 
access to finance, and even shorter planning horizons.
of finance for meeting basic household needs, including 
following disaster events (Banerjee 2011).
4.2.3 DOMESTIC PRIVATE INVESTMENT
There is little empirical evidence about the extent to 
which domestic private investment finances climate 
change adaptation. In developing countries, micro- and 
small-enterprises, and informal businesses provide the 
largest contribution to GDP (Dalberg 2011). Many of these 
enterprises are active in sectors that are sensitive to climate 
change, notably agriculture (World Bank 2012)29. Therefore, 
when engaging the private sector in adaptation, particular 
attention should be paid to micro- and small-enterprises. 
Investments in adaptation by these companies can 
directly contribute to strengthening community resilience 
(Dougherty-Choux et al. 2015). 
4.3 MOBILISING PRIVATE SECTOR 
FINANCING FOR ADAPTATION
Interventions by donors, DFIs, bilateral agencies and 
governments can help to lower barriers (Box 4.2) to private 
sector financing for adaptation (Chapter 3). Broadly, these 
interventions can be classified as either non-financial or 
financial.
4.3.1 NON-FINANCIAL INTERVENTIONS
Non-financial interventions are policies and regulations that 
influence both investment conditions, and the specific kinds of 
29 Micro- and small-enterprises are particularly affected by disasters, 
and many go bankrupt after a natural disaster, because they lack the 
financial means to face the costs of it (UNISDR 2013, UNDP 2013).
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investments that are incentivised. Examples include (see also 
Stenek et al. 2013):
• Provision of data and information. The private sector 
is unlikely to invest in climate and hydrological data, or in 
decision-support tools for climate change-related risks, as 
these are often perceived as public goods.
• Improved institutional arrangements. Ensuring 
appropriate coordination among public agencies, and 
nurturing public-private partnerships that facilitate 
implementation can foster private sector engagement.
• Introduction of conducive policies. These include, 
for example, inducements such as technical standards or 
local zoning regulations that take into account changing 
climate risks, or financial incentives for adaptation-
relevant technologies and practices.
Another important role for the public sector is to remove those 
policies that potentially create maladaptation. For instance, low 
water prices can lead to over-extraction and make investments 
in drip-irrigation unattractive (IFC and EBRD 2013).
4.3.2 FINANCIAL INTERVENTIONS
To shift private sector finance towards adaptation, public 
actors can rely on three main financial interventions: public 
lending, risk guarantees and export credits, and public-private 
partnerships (with a specific financial focus).30 These are 
described in the following paragraphs, which complement the 
findings presented in Chapter 3.
PUBLIC LENDING FOR PRIVATE EXPENDITURE
Of all providers of international climate finance, only multi-
lateral development banks report on the level of support 
provided directly to private sector recipients (IDFC-MDB 
2015). These data reveal two interesting patterns. Firstly, while 
roughly one-third of the multi-lateral development banks’ 
overall climate finance in 2014 was borrowed or received by 
private actors, less than 3 per cent of the US$5 billion spent 
in adaptation finance went to private recipients. Secondly, 
although approximately 30 per cent of all multi-lateral 
development bank adaptation finance went to LDCs and 
SIDS, only a tiny fraction of this (US$3 million) went directly to 
private recipients.
Directing public finance towards private recipients does not 
necessarily ensure good or diverse adaptation outcomes in 
all sectors, or with all types of private actors. For example, 
an analysis of development finance institutions and climate 
funds that provide private finance argues that (i) they tend to 
30 Public institutions are also able to blend public finance with private 
finance in order, for instance, to lower the cost of capital (blending 
commercial debt with grants to provide concessional lending), to 
provide credit lines to local finance institutions for adaptation-re-
lated investments, or to provide risk-sharing instruments such 
as first-loss guarantees, and separate treatment of political risks 
(UNEP 2011).
focus on large projects, often involving foreign corporations, 
and (ii) they deploy a wide array of tools to support private 
companies, but most do not reach the informal economy, 
and are frequently inadequate for supporting micro- and 
small-enterprises in developing countries (Pereira et al. 2013).31 
Moreover, reliance on financial intermediaries can result in 
weak monitoring and transparency, and limit accountability 
(Dzebo et al. 2015).
RISK GUARANTEES AND EXPORT CREDITS
Public finance can help reduce investment risks in projects 
through instruments such as credit guarantees, political risk 
insurance, hedging products such as currency and interest 
swaps, and public catastrophe and weather risk insurance. 
For example, insurance can spread and transfer the risks of 
coping with climate-related natural disasters, and may provide 
incentives for risk reduction and preventative behaviour (and 
thus private adaptation expenditure) (Box 4.3). However, 
insurance coverage is still much broader in developed 
countries than in developing countries (Naidoo et al. 2012). 
To mobilise more private investment in innovative insurance 
products in developing countries, public finance is often 
needed to fund research, pilot projects, and the data 
collection that underpins local index-based insurance 
(Pierro and Desai 2011, GIZ 2014). 
Export credit agencies are another mechanism sometimes 
used to support private investment. In 2014, the OECD 
issued a revised sector understanding on export credits 
for renewable energy, climate change mitigation and 
adaptation, and water projects (OECD 2014). In an effort 
to make investments in adaptation more attractive, it sets 
favourable conditions for repayment of export credits to 
adaptation projects. It is too soon to determine the extent 
to which the revised sector understanding will contribute to 
making export credit agencies a more useful tool for private 
sector financing in adaptation. In the context of climate 
change mitigation, concerns have been raised about the 
small share of renewable energy projects financed through 
export credits, in spite of the more favourable terms that 
these projects receive, compared to projects that rely on 
fossil fuel-powered technologies (ECA-Watch 2010).
PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS
Public-private partnerships have been depicted as a useful 
vehicle for distributing risk, and thus drawing in private sector 
investment. Infrastructure projects, where private finance 
provides between 15 and 20 per cent of total investment in 
developing countries, are a case in point (Eurodad 2015).
In recent years, the financial value of public-private 
partnerships in developing countries has increased 
dramatically. Nonetheless, most partnerships are clustered 
in the energy and transport sectors in upper middle-
income countries. For example, between 2009 and 2014, 
31  These tend to be important economic actors in developing coun-
tries, including from the point of view of employment.
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Box 4.3: The R4 Rural Resilience Initiative
The R4 Rural Resilience Initiative (R4) is a joint effort by the World Food Programme and Oxfam America. It 
exemplifies how public finance can help reduce investment risks though the use of instruments such as 
weather-index insurance.
R4 promotes the use of four risk management strategies: risk reduction, risk transfer, prudent risk-taking, and 
risk reserves. It seeks to build resilience to weather-related shocks by fostering risk reduction in the form of 
communal and/or individual asset creation, and by promoting risk sharing and risk transfer. The initiative comes 
as a response to the lack of insurance mechanisms for addressing aggregate risk in developing countries, and 
minimal uptake of insurance when it is made available.
During the 2015 agricultural season, R4 provided weather-index insurance and supported the creation of 
disaster-risk reduction assets for more than 32,000 farmers in Ethiopia, Senegal, Malawi and Zambia. R4 works 
with local private insurance companies and microfinance institutions, as well as global reinsurers such as 
SwissRe.
only four partnerships out of 189 were finalised for water 
infrastructure across all low-income countries.32 This pattern 
may change over time, as many countries are still developing 
institutional frameworks to support such partnerships 
(Kennedy and Corfee-Morlot 2012).
32 An inventory of public-private partnerships is available online at: http://
ppi.worldbank.org/~/media/GIAWB/PPI/Documents/Data-Notes/PPI-
Note-IDA-Countries-to-2009-2014.pdf 
However, the benefits of public-private partnerships in 
supporting public goals, like adaptation, are sometimes 
contested. Based on an analysis of public-private 
partnerships for development purposes, it has been 
suggested that (i) resource mobilisation is the main rationale 
driving these partnerships, and (ii) there is little evidence of 
them delivering better quality outcomes in terms of either 
cost-effectiveness or environmental benefits (IOB 2013).
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5.1 INTRODUCTION
The previous chapters of the report signal that developing 
countries face an adaptation finance gap. Firstly, adaptation 
costs are significant and likely to increase sharply in the 
future. Secondly, although recent years have shown good 
progress in terms of increasing international public finance 
flows to adaptation, total finance for adaptation would 
have to increase significantly to meet the estimated costs of 
adaptation, and avoid an adaptation finance gap. 
In this chapter, central findings of the previous chapters of 
the report are synthesised to shed light on the following key 
questions: 
• What do we know about the adaptation finance gap? 
• What is required to bridge it?
• What is the relevance of the report’s findings in the 
context of strengthening adaptation under the Paris 
Agreement?
5.2 THE ADAPTATION FINANCE GAP  
– NOW AND IN THE FUTURE
Today, developing countries already face an adaptation 
finance gap – a gap that is likely to increase significantly 
over the period 2030 to 2050, unless new and additional 
finance for adaptation is mobilised through public and 
private sources, nationally as well as internationally. This is 
the key message emerging from the previous chapters of 
the report. While uncertainties and data limitations prevent 
firm conclusions regarding the exact size of the adaptation 
finance gap now and in the future, overcoming these 
shortcomings is unlikely to change this key message.
Figure 5.1 shows how the adaptation finance gap could 
develop for the time period until 2050. As Chapters 3 and 
4 illustrate, currently it is only possible to include data on 
international public adaptation finance flows. The figure 
consequently shows how international public finance for 
adaptation compares to the estimated costs of adaptation 
for three different points in time: now, 2030 and 2050. 
For 2030 and 2050 the figure further illustrates how the 
estimated costs of adaptation compare to the commitment 
by developed country parties of mobilizing US$100 billion 
per year for mitigation and adaptation from 2020 (assuming 
that this amount will be split equally between mitigation and 
adaptation). Figure 5.1 thus gives an indication of how much 
greater total finance for adaptation would have to be to 
avoid an adaptation finance gap at these three points in time. 
Figure 5.1 shows that adaptation costs today are likely to be 
at least two-to-three times higher than international public 
finance for adaptation. Estimates of current adaptation costs 
(US$56-73 billion per annum for the period 2010-2019) are 
taken from the World Bank (2010), which is the key source 
for the global adaptation cost estimate of US$70-100 
billion for developing countries for the period 2010-2050, 
referenced by the IPCC and cited in Chapter 2. This range 
of current adaptation costs is comparable to the indicative 
adaptation cost estimates included in the adaptation 
components of developing country NDCs. The estimate of 
current international public adaptation finance flowing to 
developing countries of US$22.5 billion in 2014 is taken from 
Chapter 3. 
Turning to 2030, the assessment of national- and sector-
based studies in Chapter 2 concluded that, by 2030, 
adaptation costs are likely to be in the range of US$140-
300 billion per annum, that is, two-to-three times higher 
than the World Bank estimates of US$70-100 billion. Total 
finance for adaptation would thus have to be six-to-thirteen 
times higher than current levels of international public 
adaptation finance to avoid an adaptation finance gap in 
2030. International public adaptation finance is, however, 
unlikely to remain at current levels until 2030. As noted 
earlier in the report, the Paris Agreement restated the 2020 
commitment by developed country parties of mobilizing 
US$100 billion per year for adaptation and mitigation until 
2025, and requires parties to increase that commitment 
after 2025. For this reason it may be more relevant to 
compare the estimated adaptation costs in 2030 to this 
international climate finance commitment. Assuming that 
the commitment of mobilizing US$100 billion per year from 
2020 is fully met (and potentially increased after 2025), and 
assuming that this amount is distributed equally between 
mitigation and adaptation, international adaptation finance 
flows from developed to developing countries for adaptation 
would reach at least US$50 billion by 2030. Under these 
assumptions, total finance for adaptation would have to 
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Figure 5.1: Conceptualising the adaptation finance gap
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be roughly three-to-six times higher to meet likely finance 
needs in 2030. 
It should be noted that, as specified in Chapter 3, the 
current figure of US$22.5 billion for international public 
finance flowing to developing countries includes all 
tracked international public financial flows for adaptation. 
This figure combines ODA and non-ODA finance 
originating from developed and developing country 
governments, adaptation-dedicated multilateral climate 
funds and development finance institutions. These flows 
are much broader than the amount that counts towards 
developed countries’ commitment of mobilizing US$100 
billion per year from 2020. It follows that part of the 
international public finance for adaptation by 2030 would 
not be included in the US$50 billion figure outlined 
above.
In 2050, adaptation costs could be in the range of US$280-500 
billion (four-to-five times US$70-100 billion, see Chapter 2). 
The potential adaptation finance gap would consequently be 
much larger – in the order of between twelve-to-twenty-two 
times current flows of international public adaptation finance, 
or six-to-ten times the US$50 billion commitment (assuming 
an equal split between adaptation and mitigation). 
As noted previously in the report, adaptation costs, and thus 
finance needs, are emissions dependent. Adaptation costs 
in 2030, and particularly 2050, could be even higher than 
indicated in this section if mitigation ambition is insufficient 
to keep the world on a 2°C track.
Finally, although the report finds that adaptation costs are 
likely to be much higher than previous estimates, they still 
only represent a fraction of current and projected GDP. 
 
5.3 BRIDGING THE  
ADAPTATION FINANCE GAP
To address the adaptation finance gap effectively, action 
targeted both at (i) reducing adaptation needs, and thereby 
the costs of adaptation, and (ii) scaling up the level of 
finance flowing to adaptation, is required. Efficiency is a 
main issue for both types of action. The following section 
highlights key options for bridging the adaptation finance 
gap effectively and efficiently within these two areas, 
drawing on the findings of the previous chapters of the 
report. 
5.3.1 ENHANCING MITIGATION AMBITION
Mitigation ambition has direct implications for adaptation 
needs and costs. The assessment undertaken in this report 
and in the preliminary UNEP Adaptation Gap Report 
(UNEP 2014) confirms that adaptation costs are emission-
dependent. This is expected for longer timeframes, looking 
beyond 2050, since there is a time lag between the point in 
time when greenhouse gases are emitted and the point in 
time when climate change impacts materialise. However, 
indicative results from integrated assessment models show 
that adaptation costs may vary with different emission 
trajectories as early as 2030 (see the Appendix to this 
report). This underlines the urgency of enhancing mitigation 
ambition, and of boosting pre-2020 mitigation action, to 
limit climate change and its impacts and keep adaptation 
costs and challenges at manageable levels. Furthermore, 
it highlights the relevance of directly linking adaptation to 
the 2°C temperature target as part of the global goal on 
adaptation under the Paris Agreement.
5.3.2 MAKING DEVELOPMENT CLIMATE 
RESILIENT 
The trend in international public finance for adaptation over 
recent years reflects increasing attention to mainstreaming 
adaptation into development co-operation practices (UNEP 
2014), and a growing focus on climate resilient development. 
As the discussion in Chapter 2 highlights, it is imperative to 
address existing adaptation and development gaps, as they 
have important implications for countries’ ability to address 
adaptation needs, and reduce vulnerability in the future, as 
well as for the associated costs. 
5.3.3 SCALING UP FINANCE FOR 
ADAPTATION
Section 5.2 of this chapter illustrates the urgency of scaling 
up all sources of finance. The Paris Agreement urges 
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developed countries to “significantly increase adaptation 
finance from current levels” (UNFCCC 2015) and the UNFCCC 
process is likely to be critical for increasing international 
finance for adaptation. While it is widely acknowledged that 
there is a need to bring all types of finance into play, it is also 
clear that adaptation in developing countries will continue to 
require grants. Tracking domestic funding is a priority, as this 
source of financing is believed to be important in the near-
and longer-term, and data about its size and destinations are 
currently lacking. 
Similarly, a more systematic and explicit approach is required 
to both understand the extent to which private sector 
financing complements public sector budgets, and the 
ways in which private sector engagement can be bolstered. 
One of the emerging lessons is the need to establish policy 
frameworks and legislation that creates the incentives for 
private sector investment in adaptation. This is an area where 
experience and best practice from numerous other areas, 
notably mitigation and environment, is available to inform 
the process.
While quantitative estimates of private finance flows for 
adaptation are lacking, private domestic investment and 
remittances are good examples of adaptation-relevant 
investment. Private domestic investment levels are rising in 
developing countries and, if this trend holds true for micro- 
and small-sized enterprises, a portion of those funds can 
be expected to be spent on adaptation-relevant activities, 
particularly for those enterprises active in agriculture, a sector 
that is especially sensitive to climate change.
Remittances may be valuable from an adaptation perspective 
because they tend to increase in cases of catastrophic 
weather events and natural disasters in migrants’ countries of 
origin. Furthermore, remittances reach households directly, 
including those in remote and vulnerable areas, more so than 
public finance flows.
The above points are well aligned with the information 
provided in the adaptation components of the NDCs, where 
it is apparent that countries perceive a current finance gap, 
and that they realise the need for domestic budgets as a 
key part of the solution for bridging that gap. They are also 
aware of the need for greater mobilisation of private finance 
(both domestic and international). Nonetheless, international 
public finance is still perceived as a key source of finance for 
adaptation.
5.3.4 ENSURING EFFECTIVENESS AND 
EFFICIENCY OF RESOURCE USE
Effectiveness and efficiency implies that available funds are 
targeted where they are most needed and used optimally 
to ensure they have the greatest possible impact. To this 
end, and in addition to other goals, such as maximising the 
number of beneficiaries, prioritising the most vulnerable, 
or delivering the highest value for money, prioritising 
adaptation will be of the utmost importance (Chapter 
2). There is growing evidence that adaptation has the 
potential to be extremely beneficial and cost-effective 
when planned with uncertainty and implementation in 
mind. Against this background, the importance of the 
phasing and timing of adaptation practices is increasingly 
being recognised: more and more, adaptation actions are 
differentiated depending on whether they target current 
climate variability or future climate change. Overall, there is 
a shift toward early adaptation actions, low-regret options, 
capacity building, and options that build-in flexibility and 
robustness for long-term decisions, complemented with 
early planning for major future risks – all of it increasingly 
integrated in regular development projects and actions, as 
highlighted above.
Total finance flows to adaptation are not known, which 
hampers attempts to both evaluate the effectiveness of 
current spending levels, and determine future financing 
requirements. As highlighted in Chapter 3, a proper 
measurement, tracking, and reporting system of adaptation 
investments is indispensable to ensure that finance is used 
efficiently and targeted where it is most needed. To date, 
resources disbursed through adaptation-focused climate 
funds have had some of the poorest countries in sub-
Saharan African and South Asia as main recipients, and 
small-island developing states are among the main recipients 
of adaptation finance for disaster-risk reduction. Increasing 
the transparency of reporting by finance providers in general, 
and particularly for dedicated adaptation funds, is central to 
document and enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of 
climate finance. 
There is evidence that dedicated climate funds are helping 
break down barriers to investment in adaptation projects in 
developing countries and play an important role in catalysing 
a wide range of adaptation-related investments. They do 
this by strengthening the capacities of local stakeholders, 
creating incentives for institutions and investors (for example, 
by offering concessional terms) and, ultimately, by taking on 
risks from which commercial financiers would typically shy 
away.
To summarize, bridging the adaptation finance gap is 
not only a question of mobilising more resources. As 
highlighted in Chapter 4, both public and private sector 
finance have to be placed in the context of effective 
delivery, to ensure that finance corresponds to the priorities 
and needs of recipient countries and communities, and 
results in lasting outcomes.
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5.4 THE PARIS AGREEMENT  
AND THE WAY FORWARD
The Paris Agreement contains a number of provisions that 
are central to discussions on adaptation costs, needs and 
finance. This section highlights some of these provisions, 
while suggesting options for bolstering adaptation finance 
and, more generally, for making progress toward adaptation.
As noted above, clear goals and targets are indispensable to 
identify adaptation needs and options, steer investments, 
enable progress-tracking, and strengthen policy awareness 
and action. Indeed, that is a key premise behind the UNEP 
gap reports. Experience from other global processes, such 
as the Millennium Development Goals and the Sustainable 
Development Goals, corroborates the importance of setting 
targets to enhance policy commitment and action.
The Paris Agreement establishes a global adaptation goal 
“of enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience 
and reducing vulnerability to climate change, with a view 
to contributing to sustainable development and ensuring 
an adequate adaptation response in the context of the 
temperature goal referred to in Article 2” (UNFCCC 2015). 
The goal can be seen as recognition that adaptation is both 
a global and a local challenge, or as reflecting an implicit 
principle of common, but differentiated, adaptation needs. 
However, since it is a highly generic and qualitative goal, a 
central question remains: how to operationalise it at different 
scales (local to global), as part of the implementation of the 
Agreement. 
More specific goals, targets and indicators for adaptation that 
build on an in-depth understanding of local and national 
vulnerabilities, priorities and needs, seem critical from an 
operational perspective. The NDCs highlight current and 
short-term expected adaptation needs and priorities, and 
several of the adaptation components include information 
that can be used as a first step toward cementing adaptation 
goals and targets at sectoral and national levels. The 
NDCs made clear that knowledge of adaptation costs and 
financing flows is fundamental for developing countries 
to manage medium to long-term adaptation. The need for 
consistent methodologies and metrics around adaptation 
costs and finance became apparent from the NDCs, and is 
echoed in the Paris Agreement.
The assessment of the evidence on adaptation needs and 
costs, and adaptation finance flows provided in this report 
highlights that flexible, but clear and comprehensive, 
frameworks are needed to guide national assessments 
and underpin global stocktaking efforts. Methodology 
development is emphasised and will be required to 
implement the provisions of the Paris Agreement – both 
those that entail action on the part of parties to the climate 
convention, and those that mandate the secretariat to the 
convention to conduct a global stocktaking.
In regards to estimating the costs of adaptation, three key 
messages emerge. Firstly, as demonstrated in Chapter 2, 
there is an urgent need for more empirical studies to address 
key coverage gaps for those sectors or risks which are 
currently poorly or partially covered. Moreover, to ensure the 
success of such empirical studies, there is a need for testing 
how the choice of methods and assumptions affect the cost 
estimates, for example, with sensitivity testing and multi-
model analyses. Secondly, there are important potential 
lessons to be learnt from assessing cost out-turns (ex post 
costs) from existing or early adaptation practice, to better 
take account of opportunity, transaction and implementation 
costs. Thirdly, it is important to better understand the 
transferability of options (by aggregation scale and between 
locations).
In regards to estimating adaptation finance, three provisions 
under the Paris Agreement are of particular relevance. The 
Paris Agreement urges developed countries to “significantly 
increase adaptation finance from current levels” and one of 
the convention’s subsidiary bodies is requested to develop 
modalities for the accounting of financial resources provided 
and mobilised through public interventions. Such an effort is 
expected to increase the accountability of financial pledges 
for climate change. Additionally, the political commitment 
for a (low-carbon and) climate-resilient economy is renewed, 
which strengthens the position of first-mover investors 
and financiers, and represents a call for action to laggards. 
This is particularly relevant in relation to the findings of this 
assessment, as Chapter 3 demonstrated that increasing 
adaptation finance flows remains an urgent priority. 
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